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With the advent of cloud computing, everyone from Fortune 500 businesses to
personal consumers to the US government is storing massive amounts of sensitive data
in service centers that may not be trustworthy. It is of vital importance to leverage
the benefits of storing data in the cloud while simultaneously ensuring the privacy of
the data. Homomorphic encryption allows one to securely delegate the processing of
private data. As such, it has managed to hit the sweet spot of academic interest and
industry demand. Though the concept was proposed in the 1970s, no cryptosystem
realizing this goal existed until Craig Gentry published his PhD thesis in 2009.
In this thesis, we conduct a study of the two main methods for construction
of homomorphic encryption schemes along with functional encryption and the hard
problems upon which their security is based. These hard problems include the Ap-
proximate GCD problem (A-GCD), the Learning With Errors problem (LWE), and
various lattice problems. In addition, we discuss many of the proposed and in some
cases implemented practical applications of these cryptosystems.
Finally, we focus on the Approximate GCD problem (A-GCD). This problem
forms the basis for the security of Gentry’s original cryptosystem but has not yet been
linked to more standard cryptographic primitives. After presenting several algorithms
in the literature that attempt to solve the problem, we introduce some new algorithms
to attack the problem.
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F Denotes any finite field
Fp Denotes the finite field with p elements
N Denotes the set of natural numbers
R Denotes the set of real numbers
Rn Denotes the set of n-dimensional vectors where each component is an
element of R
Z Denotes the ring of integers
Zp Denotes the ring of integers modulo p
Znp Denotes the set of n-dimensional vectors where each component is an
element of Zp
x Denotes a vector
xi Denotes the i-th vector in an indexed set
x[i] Denotes the i-th component of the vector x
‖x‖ Denotes the norm of x, assumed to be the standard Euclidean norm
‖x‖p Denotes the p-norm of x




det(M) Denotes the determinant of the matrix M
bae Denotes rounding a to the nearest integer
a mod p Denotes reducing a modulo p into the interval (−p/2, p/2]




a(i) Denotes the i-th bit in the binary representation of a




In the last 40 years, the computer and the internet have fundamentally changed
the way data is stored and transferred. During this time, many cryptosystems have
been proposed to protect this digital data. Now, the rapid adoption and widespread
use of cloud computing is posing a new challenge. Can data be stored and processed
remotely without compromising privacy? A solution to this problem is homomorphic
encryption.
A cryptosystem is a scheme for securing data. Unsecured data is called a
plaintext or message, and secured data is called a ciphertext. An encryption function
E and an encryption key K are used to secure data and a decryption function D and
a decryption key k are used to retrieve data. The functions E and D are such that






When the key for encryption and decryption are the same (i.e. K = k), the cryp-
tosystem is said to be a symmetric key system. If person A wants to send data to
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person B in a secure fashion using this type of system, they must agree on the key in
advance. In many cases, like transmission over the internet, this may be impossible.
To accommodate these situations, two separate keys are used: a public key (K) for
encrypting data and a private key (k) for decrypting data, and the system is called a
public key cryptosystem.
In their 1978 paper [43], Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos proposed the idea
of homomorphic cryptosystems. Intuitively, a cryptosystem with encryption function
E and plaintext messages m1 and m2 is homomorphically correct for an operation ?
on the plaintext space and corresponding operation  on the ciphertext space if
E(m1) E(m2) = E(m1 ? m2). (1.1)
Basically this means that applying the operation  to the encrypted data is the same
as applying the operation ? to the original unencrypted data and then encrypting
the result. Thus, in some sense, the order of application does not matter between
applying the encryption function and applying the operation. One can encrypt the
data and then apply  or one can apply ? to the data and then encrypt the result.
Both ciphertexts will decrypt to m1 ? m2. Since operations may be performed after
data is encrypted, a homomorphic system allows a user to hand off the processing of
private data to an untrusted party. This is done by encrypting the data, sending it
out for processing, and then decrypting the result that is returned. The untrusted
party only deals with ciphertexts so the privacy of the data is maintained.
The homomorphic property (1.1) is appropriate for a deterministic cryptosys-
tem, a system where each plaintext corresponds to exactly one ciphertext. However,
in a cryptosystem where a plaintext message has many different encryptions due
to randomness in the encryption process (i.e. a probabilistic system) we revise the
2









= m1 ? m2. (1.2)
This is due to the fact that E(m1)E(m2) is one of many encryptions of m1?m2 so we
just insist that decrypting E(m1)E(m2) yields m1 ?m2. In fact, for a probabilistic
system it is almost always the case that E(m1) E(m2) 6= E(m1 ? m2).
In a cloud computing application that utilizes homomorphic encryption, an
untrusted party will be given access to the encryption of all the private data. If
the encryption algorithm is deterministic they might be able to recognize patterns in
the encrypted data which reveal information about the underlying plaintext data. To
ensure that this does not occur, a probabilistic system should be used. A probabilistic
cryptosystem is secure if the following properties hold.
1. Given a message m and a ciphertext c, it is computationally impossible to
determine if c is an encryption of m.
2. Given two plaintext messages m1 6= m2 and a ciphertext c that is the encryption
of one of them, it is computationally impossible to determine whether c is an
encryption of m1 or m2. (indistinguishability of chosen plaintexts)
A natural extension of a cryptosystem that is homomorphically correct for a
single operation is one that is correct for the evaluation of a function (or a class of
functions). Normally, one might compute
FUNCTION(parameters, data)→ results
3






For example, if we have plaintext messages in F2 (i.e. bits) and ciphertexts which
are integers, then the following diagram provides an overview of homomorphically
evaluating a function f . The function f̂ is a related function on the ciphertext space
which depends on f and possibly the keys k and K, EK is the encryption function,
and Dk is the decryption function.
Figure 1.1: Homomorphic Encryption Overview
A cryptosystem that is homomorphically correct for every function on the
plaintext space is said to be a fully homomorphic system (FHS), while systems that are
correct for only some operations are known as partially homomorphic systems (PHS).
If a cryptosystem is homomorphically correct for any type of operation, but can only
handle a limited number of applications of an operation it is called a somewhat
homomorphic system (SHS).
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To obtain a fully homomorphic cryptosystem may seem like an unattainable
goal at first glance, but note the following. Functions that can be evaluated on a
computer can be represented as a Boolean circuit. Over a finite field, Boolean opera-
tions can be represented as an expression involving only addition and multiplication
operations over that field. Consequently, any cryptosystem which is additively and
multiplicatively homomorphic can homomorphically evaluate any function and will
thus be a fully homomorphic system. Oftentimes a cryptosystem can provide homo-
morphic addition (Pallier cryptosystem) or homomorphic multiplication (ElGamal or
RSA) but not both simultaneously.
The process of taking a function and creating a Boolean circuit that corre-
sponds to it is an active research area. There are often several circuits which cor-
respond to the same arithmetic expression. For example, consider the “majority of
three” function, MAJ(x1, x2, x3), which takes as input three bits and returns 1 if two
or more of the arguments are 1s and 0 otherwise. The circuits shown below, which
correspond to x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3 = x1(x2 + x3) + x2x3 and (x1 + x2)(x1 + x3) + x1
respectively are both valid circuits for the majority function, but the second one in-
volves only a single multiplication instead of the two required for the first one. This
example is taken from [6].
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Figure 1.2: Majority Circuit 1 Figure 1.3: Majority Circuit 2
The “best” possible circuit representations of a function is dependent on the applica-
tion (often the one with the fewest number of multiplications) and in some cases it is
not even clear as to what the best representation is.
There are some minor qualifications on the premise that any function that
can be run on a computer can be represented as a Boolean circuit. For example, the
WHILE construct is a common feature of many mainstream programming languages
which executes its body until the test condition is satisfied. The exact number of
times the body will be executed is unknown until runtime and thus would require a
circuit of unbounded depth to represent it. So, to represent a function including this
construct as a circuit one must provide an upper bound on the number of executions
of the WHILE loop. This is similar to the approach needed to run programs on a
Turing machine that does not have random access. In fact, when designing a circuit to
represent a function no optimizations at all may be made based on information about
the data being processed since the point of homomorphic encryption is to process
data while it is encrypted.
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A fully homomorphic cryptosystem allows one to securely delegate the pro-
cessing of private data. Typically, a user will first encrypt some private data, then
hand the encrypted data over to some untrusted third party which will perform the
desired computations on the encrypted data. To this third party, the result they
obtain from this computation is nonsensical, but when the user receives it back they
decrypt it to obtain the result of applying that same computation to the original
unencrypted data. In a sense, the user has outsourced the computation of the data
while maintaining the security of the data.
There are several desired properties of such a system. First, the privacy of the
data should be maintained. The party doing the homomorphic computation should
not be able to learn anything (or at least not anything that the user considers to be
private) about the data they are processing. Second, since the point of using homo-
morphic encryption is to off-load the work involved in processing the data to someone
else, the user should not do more work in recovering the result of the homomorphic
evaluation than he would have otherwise incurred in performing the computations
himself on the unencrypted data. This property is referred to as ciphertext compact-
ness and basically requires that the size of the ciphertext does not grow with the
complexity of the function being evaluated. Third, the scheme should be efficient in
terms of space. Like any cryptosystem, the ciphertext expansion (i.e. the ratio of the
size of the ciphertext to the size of the underlying plaintext) should be small.




KeyGen security parameter (λ) secret key (k) and public key (K)
Encrypt plaintext (m) and public key (K) ciphertext (c)
Re-crypt a noisy ciphertext c for m a fresh ciphertext c̄ for m
Decrypt ciphertext (c) and secret key (k) plaintext (m)
Table 1.1: Functions in a Homomorphic Cryptosystem
Creating a fully homomorphic system poses several challenges. First, designing
a system that exhibits the homomorphic properties discussed above and can be proven
to be secure is quite difficult. Second, any function that is to be homomorphically
evaluated needs to be represented as a Boolean circuit, and finding a good circuit
representation is often hard. Third, all of the homomorphic cryptosystems that have
been proposed so far are impractical in terms of the time it takes to process data and
the size of the ciphertexts and keys. In Chapter 2, we define the hard problems that
are used as a basis for many homomorphic systems. Next, in Chapter 3, we examine
the two main families of homomorphic cryptosystems as well as functional encryption.
Then, in Chapter 4, we survey current and potential applications for homomorphic
encryption. Finally, in Chapter 5, we consider the approximate GCD problem and




The security of any cryptosystem is based on a problem that is hard to solve.
These problems are known as security primitives. There are a couple of ways in which
a problem may be hard to solve. First, it may be hard in an information-theoretic
sense. This means that using the information provided to an attacker there is no
way to distinguish between a correct or incorrect solution to the problem. Second,
it may be hard in a computational sense. In this case, a solution is easily verified as
being correct, but finding that solution even using advanced algorithms and significant
amounts of computing power is challenging. While information-theoretic problems
are the stronger of the two, there are very few of them and so many cryptosystems
are based on computationally hard primitives.
An example of a problem that is hard to solve in the information-theoretic
sense is recovering a plaintext message that has been encrypted with a one-time pad.
In a one-time pad encryption system the plaintext, m, is a binary string and the key,
k, is a binary string that is used only once to encrypt a plaintext. The encryption of
m is simply the binary string c = m ⊕ k. Given the ciphertext, c, the attacker can
always find a key, k̄, such that the ciphertext could be the encryption of any possible
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message, m̄, since if k̄ = m̄ ⊕ c then m̄ ⊕ k̄ = c. Since every pair (m̄, k̄) is a valid
plaintext-key pair producing the ciphertext, c, the attacker cannot determine m or k.
An example of a problem that is hard to solve in the computational sense is
factoring a number, n, which is the product of two large primes. There are known
algorithms for factoring, but none of them run in time that is polynomial in the
number of bits of n. So by choosing the bit size of the prime factors to be large
enough, the attacker will be unable to factor n in a reasonable amount of time using
as much computational power as he has available at his disposal.
Computationally hard problems are susceptible to advances in technology.
First, as advancements are made in computer hardware the size of these problem
instances may need to be increased to maintain the same level of practical security.
Second, improvements in algorithms may also necessitate an increase in the problem
parameters. Many computational problems are assumed to be hard because no one
has yet discovered an efficient way to solve them, but that does not rule out the
possibility of someone coming along and finding an efficient way to do so. Third,
many computationally hard problems are assumed to be hard in the classical sense.
This means that a practical implementation of a quantum computer would make these
problems no longer hard. An example of this is Peter Shor’s algorithm for factoring
numbers using a quantum computer. Problems, that are not susceptible to algorithms
on a quantum computer are said to be post-quantum primitives.
The complexity of algorithms that attempt to solve these hard problems are
measured in terms of the total number of bit operations as a function of the size of
the input parameters. Algorithms are said to run in polynomial time if the number
of bit operations needed to solve a problem is a polynomial function of the size of
the input parameters. Though the degree of the polynomial may be large and the
coefficients may be huge, these algorithms are considered to have efficiently solved
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the problem. An algorithm is said to run in exponential time if the number of bit
operations is an exponential function of the size of the input parameters. Though
the exponent may be tiny and the coefficients may be quite small, these algorithms
are not considered to have efficiently solved the problem since as the parameter sizes
increase the running time will eventually pass that of any polynomial time algorithm.
We now describe some of the hard problems on which the security of cryptog-
raphy schemes are based. For each problem, the best known algorithm for solving it
is exponential in the problem size.
2.1 The Approximate GCD Problem
Problem 1 (Approximate GCD Problem (A-GCD))
Given a set of m integers of the form xi = qip + ri where qi, p, ri ∈ Z and qi and ri
are chosen randomly from some distribution (possibly different distributions), find p.
The size (in binary) of ri is smaller than that of p and the size of p is much
smaller than the size of qi. Often, qi is chosen uniformly at random from the set of
all integers of a fixed size in binary and ri is chosen to be non-zero from a Gaussian
distribution centered at zero with a maximum size in binary. If two or more of the
ri’s are 0, then by computing the GCD of all m
2 pairs (xi, xj) with i 6= j one can
recover p. For this reason, the extra stipulation that ri 6= 0 is added.
Currently, there are no algorithms in the literature which can solve this prob-
lem in time that is polynomial in the binary size of qi, p, and ri. Oftentimes, a slightly
relaxed version called the Partial Approximate GCD Problem (pA-GCD) is used. In
this variant, x0 = q0p is a distinguished clean multiple of p. Though it seems to be
easier, none of the known algorithms can solve even this variant in polynomial time.




A lattice L of dimension n is a set of points in Rn that is closed under addition. This
set of points is generated by taking all possible integer combinations of the vectors









A lattice has many bases. For example, L can be generated by {b1,b2} or {d1,d2}.
Figure 2.1: Lattice Basis B = {b1,b2} for L
Figure 2.2: Lattice Basis D = {d1,d2} for L
Definition 2 (Lattice Volume)
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Let B = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn} be a basis for a lattice L, and define each entry of a matrix
M as Mi,j = 〈vi,vj〉. The volume of L is vol(L) = | det(M)|, and will be the same
for any basis of L.
Since a lattice is obtained by taking integer combinations of finitely many
vectors, there is at least one non-zero vector of minimum size. In the basis D above,
it appears that d2 is a short vector, but it may not be a shortest vector if b1 or b2
(or some other vector in L) is shorter.
Definition 3 (λn(L))
The length of a set of vectors in L is the size of the largest vector in the set. For
a lattice L, λn(L) is the minimum length among all sets of n linearly independent
vectors in L. Thus, λ1(L) is the size of a smallest nonzero vector in L.
A classic result known as Minkowski’s Theorem [37] provides a bound on the
smallest size of a non-zero vector in a lattice.
Theorem 1 (Minkowski’s Theorem)
For a lattice L with dimension n, λ1(L) < 2
n · vol(L).
Generally, a basis composed of short and mostly orthogonal vectors is desired
as many computations on lattices are easier for such a basis. To obtain such a basis,
one can utilize the celebrated LLL algorithm by Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász [30].
This algorithm uses the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process and rounding to
transform a basis for a lattice into a shorter, more orthogonal basis.
The two main hard problems for lattices are as follows.
Problem 2 (Shortest Vector Problem (SVP))
Given a basis for a lattice L of dimension n, output a nonzero vector v ∈ L with
length λ1(L) (i.e. find a shortest nonzero vector).
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This problem was shown to be NP-hard in [50]. From the introduction in [27], this
problem can be solved with a deterministic algorithm having complexity nn/2+o(n) see
[28] or using a probabilistic algorithm with complexity 2O(n) see [2].
Problem 3 (Closest Vector Problem (CVP))
Given a basis for a lattice L of dimension n and a vector t ∈ Rn, output a vector
v ∈ L such that ‖t− v‖ ≤ ‖t− u‖ for all u ∈ L.
This problem was shown to be as hard as solving SVP in [24], so it is also NP-hard.
It can be solved with an algorithm having complexity Õ(22n) see [36].
There is no known algorithm for solving either of these problems in time that
is polynomial in the dimension of the lattice. Most algorithms, such as the LLL
algorithm, instead guarantee that they can find a solution which is within some small
approximating factor of the true solution. The following lattice problems are such
approximating problems, where the approximating factor γ > 1 is a function of n,
the dimension of the lattice.
Problem 4 (γ-Shortest Vector Problem (SVP))
Given a basis for a lattice L of dimension n, output a nonzero vector v ∈ L of length
at most γ · λ1(L).
In [34], this problem was shown to be NP-hard for γ < 21/p for any p-norm.
Problem 5 (γ-Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP))
Given a basis for a lattice L of dimension n, output a set of linearly independent
vectors v1,v2, . . . ,vn ∈ L such that max
i∈{1,2,...,n}
‖vi‖ < γ · λn(L).
In [4], it was shown that this problem is NP-hard for γ < 2[log(n)]
1−ε
where ε > 0 is
arbitrary but fixed.
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Problem 6 (γ-Gap Shortest Vector Problem (GapSVP))
Given a basis for a lattice L of dimension n and d > 0 ∈ R, output YES if λ1(L) ≤ d
and NO if λ1(L) > γ · d. (In any other case, the output can be YES or NO).
In [35], this problem was shown to be NP-hard for γ < p
√
2 for any p-norm.
Problem 7 (γ-Closest Vector Problem (CVP))
Given a basis for a lattice L of dimension n and a vector t ∈ Rn, output a vector
v ∈ L such that ‖t− v‖ ≤ γ · dist(L, t).
In [18], this problem was shown to be NP-hard for γ < 2(logn)
1−ε
where ε = (log log n)−c
for any constant c < 1
2
.
Problem 8 (γ-Closest Vector Problem with promise)
Given a basis for a lattice L of dimension n and a vector t ∈ Rn with the promise
that there is a unique vector v ∈ L such that ‖t− v‖ ≤ γ · λ1(L), find v.
This problem is also known as the γ-Bounded Distance Decoding Problem





2.3 The LWE Problem
While it is believed that the Approximate GCD problem is hard, there is no
proof showing that this is the case. A problem that can be reduced to solving one of
these hard lattice problems is the Learning with Errors Problem (LWE). The LWE
problem was originally introduced by Regev in [42] and is described as follows.
Problem 9 (Learning With Errors Problem (LWE))
Given m samples of the form (ai, bi = 〈ai, s〉 + ei) where q > 1 and is dependent on
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n, ai ∈ Znq is chosen from a uniform random distribution, s ∈ Znq is chosen uniformly
random but fixed for all pairs, and bi, ei ∈ Zq determine the value of s.
If ei = 0, then given m = n samples this problem can be solved in polynomial
time. If ei 6= 0, then for any m that is a polynomial in n this problem seems hard to
solve. Normally, |ei| is much smaller than q.
Regev originally reduced the hardness of solving the LWE problem to solving
GapSVP and SIVP, but part of his reduction involved the use of a quantum com-
puter. In [40], Peikert was able to remove the quantum portion of the reduction and
classically reduce the hardness of solving the LWE problem to the hardness of solving
GapSVP on a general lattice. So, the LWE problem is NP-hard as well.
One additional problem is found in many of the existing homomorphic systems,
and we provide its definition below.
Problem 10 (Subset Sum Problem (SSP))




This problem is NP-complete. Additional assumptions, such as the subset T





Recall that a deterministic cryptosystem is homomorphic for an operation ?
on the plaintext space and corresponding operation  on the ciphertext space if
E(m1) E(m2) = E(m1 ? m2). (3.1)
A simple example of a deterministic cryptosystem that is partially homomor-




Public key: modulus n and exponent e
Plaintext: m ∈ Zn
Encryption: c = E(m) = me mod n
The system is multiplicatively homomorphic since (3.1) holds. Here the operation on
the plaintext space and the ciphertext space are the same: multiplication modulo n.
E(m1) · E(m2) = me1 ·me2 ≡ (m1 ·m2)e mod n = E(m1 ·m2).
This system is only partially homomorphic since other operations, such as addition,
do not satisfy the homomorphic property.




2 mod n 6≡ (m1 +m2)e mod n = E(m1 +m2).










= m1 ? m2. (3.2)
A simple example of a probabilistic cryptosystem is the ElGamal cryptosystem,
which was proposed in [19].
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ElGamal Cryptosystem
Secret key: s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q − 1} chosen randomly
Public key: q
a cyclic group G of order q
α which is a generator for G
h = αs
Plaintext: m ∈ G
Encryption: Pick a random r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q − 1}
Compute g = αr and y = hr ·m
Ciphertext is c = (g, y)
Decryption: Compute y · (gs)−1 = (αrs ·m) · (αrs)−1 = m
First, note that multiple encryptions of m are likely to be different since a different
r will be chosen each time. Second, this system is homomorphically correct for mul-
tiplication. Since the system is probabilistic, we show that Property 3.2 holds for
ciphertexts c1 = (α
r1 , hr1 · m1) and c2 = (αr2 , hr2 · m2). Here the operation on the
plaintext space is multiplication in G and the operation on the ciphertext space is
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This cryptosystem is also only a partially homomorphic system since it cannot
handle addition. Both of these examples are multiplicatively homomorphic, but in
general most partially homomorphic systems can handle addition but not multiplica-
tion.
Though the concept of a fully homomorphic encryption system was proposed
in 1978, little progress was made on developing such a system for the next 30 years.
There were several attempts to create a fully homomorphic cryptosystem, and some
systems that just happened to have homomorphic properties. A summary of some of
these systems (based on [48]) is provided in Table 3.1.
20
Year Citation Author(s) Capabilities
1978 [44] Rivest, Shamir,
and Adleman
unlimited multiplications
1984 [26] Goldwasser and Micali unlimited XOR of bits
1985 [19] ElGamal unlimited multiplications
1985 [14] Cohen and Fischer unlimited additions
1996 [1] Ajtai and Dwork lattice based system with proba-
bilistically unlimited additions
1999 [39] Paillier unlimited additions (mod m)
1999 [46] Sander, Young,
and Yung
compute logical AND (homomor-
phic over a semigroup)
2005 [5] Boneh, Goh,
and Nissim
unlimited additions and a single
multiplication
2008 [41] Peikert and Waters unlimited additions
Table 3.1: Early Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
In 2009, Stanford PhD student Craig Gentry proposed the first fully homo-
morphic encryption system in his thesis [20]. This seminal work also provided a basic
outline for achieving fully homomorphic encryption. The outline is often referred to
as “Gentry’s blueprint” in the literature.
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Though the system proposed by Gentry in his thesis and those that follow
Gentry’s blueprint are theoretically correct they are impractical. For example, in
Gentry’s original scheme, to obtain 2λ security, each plaintext bit is encrypted as a
ciphertext that has λ5 · polylog(λ) bits and requires λ6 · polylog(λ) amount of compu-
tation to decrypt [21]. Since the publication of his thesis, many improvements have
been made to increase the efficiency of his scheme in terms of runtime and storage
space. Though substantial progress has been made, the scheme and its variants are
still unsuitable for practical implementation.
Another point of concern in Gentry’s work is the theoretical underpinnings
of his security reductions. The systems which follow Gentry’s blueprint base their
security on the assumed hardness of certain lattice problems over ideal lattices. These
approaches often include other very strong assumptions such as the hardness of the
sparse subset sum problem (SSSP). Since these problems have not been studied as
extensively over ideal lattices as they have been for general lattices, there is a fair
amount of skepticism in the literature as to whether these problems are truly hard.
In 2011, a second approach to creating a fully homomorphic system was pro-
posed by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan in [10]. This approach was the first to deviate
from Gentry’s blueprint in an attempt to base its security on hard problems over gen-
eral lattices. In this approach, the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem was used
as a cryptographic primitive, and its security was reduced to solving a variant of the
Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) for general lattices. The original reduction involved
a quantum component, but subsequent work by Peikert showed that the hardness of
LWE could be classically reduced to another SVP variant.
The LWE approach is very promising since it is orders of magnitude more effi-
cient. Each ciphertext is of size λ log (λ) and requires log (λ) amount of computation
to decrypt.
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The most recent approaches (as of August 2014), such as [25], focus on achiev-
ing homomorphic encryption not for any arbitrary function, but for certain classes of
functions or for specific permitted functions. These approaches are known as func-
tional encryption schemes and come with the additional feature that homomorphic
evaluation results in a plaintext result as opposed to an encrypted result. This is
done through a combination of garbled circuits, attribute based encryption (ABE),




Gentry’s main contribution was his blueprint for building a fully homomorphic
system. A summary of this blueprint is provided below. We will now examine each
of the these steps in detail.
Gentry’s Blueprint
1. Select a somewhat homomorphic system (SHS).
2. Squash the decryption circuit for the system to reduce its complexity.
3. The squashed decryption circuit can now be homomorphically evaluated cor-
rectly by the somewhat homomorphic system in a process known as bootstrap-
ping.
4. Begin evaluating the function you wish to compute on the encrypted data.
5. When operations can no longer be homomorphically computed because the error
in the ciphertexts has gotten too large, homomorphically evaluate the squashed
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decryption circuit to obtain a fresh ciphertext with small error. This is known
as ciphertext refreshing.
6. Continue evaluating the function using the fresh ciphertexts.
7. Repeat the ciphertext refreshing step as needed until the function is fully eval-
uated.
There are three main components to the systems that follow Gentry’s blueprint:
an underlying somewhat homomorphic system (SHS), a squashing technique to re-
duce the complexity of the SHS’s decryption circuit, and a bootstrapping method
to turn the SHS into a fully homomorphic system (FHS). The following example
deals with integers and is roughly the scheme developed by van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi,
and Vaikuntanathan in [49] but it can be generalized to ideals in any ring and then
extended to lattices, which is how Gentry originally posed it.
The user chooses a large odd integer p to be the secret key for the system. A
plaintext is a single bit m. To encrypt a message m and obtain a ciphertext c, the
user chooses q, e ∈ Z independently and randomly from some distribution for each
encryption and computes
E(m, p) = qp+ 2e+m.
The binary size of q is generally chosen to be greater than the binary size of p. The
binary size of e, which is referred to as the error, is much smaller than the binary size
of p. We will discuss the exact sizes for these parameters later on. The decryption
function for this system is given by
D(c, p) = (c mod p) mod 2
To see that the decryption function is correct for a ciphertext c = qp+2e+m, observe
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that
D(c, p) = (qp+ 2e+m mod p) mod 2
= (2e+m) mod 2
= m
Note that for this to work we need 2|e| + 1 < p
2





that (2e+m mod p) = 2e+m.
Though it is very simple, this cryptosystem has two very useful properties.
First, given two ciphertexts
c1 = q1p+ 2e1 +m1
c2 = q2p+ 2e2 +m2
one can add them together to obtain
c1 + c2 = (q1 + q2)p+ 2(e1 + e2) + (m1 +m2)





. So the cryptosystem
is additively homomorphic. Second, for multiplication we have
c1c2 = (q1q2p+ 2q1e2 + q1m2 + 2q2e1 + q2m1)p+ 2(2e1e2 + e1m2 + e2m1) + (m1m2)






cryptosystem is multiplicatively homomorphic.
The system as presented so far is a symmetric key cryptosystem since the
secret key p is needed for encryption and decryption.
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ciphertext (c) E(m, p) = qp+ 2e+m
Decrypt c and p m D(c, p) = (c mod p) mod 2
Table 3.2: Gentry Symmetric Key Cryptosystem
In the discussion that follows, it will be necessary to allow an untrusted user
to encrypt data. Since we do not want to hand over the secret key p to allow them to
do so (which would allow the untrusted user to decrypt ciphertexts), we need to turn
this symmetric key system into a public key system. To do so, we make the following
modifications. The KeyGen algorithm produces τ integers of the form xi = qip + ri,
where qi and ri are drawn uniformly at random and a distinguished odd value x0 with
x0 > xi and x0 = q0p (i.e. a clean multiple of p). Often the size of q and qi are the
same but the size of ri is much less than the size of the e’s used in the encryption
algorithm. These xi’s are published as the public key. The Encrypt algorithm for a







for some random subset T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , τ}. The Decrypt algorithm is unchanged and




(since the ri’s are so much smaller than e they do
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not affect the correctness of the decryption function).
In this cryptosystem, each addition increases the error size by 1 bit, while each
multiplication doubles the error size. Since this scheme can only handle homomorphic





(i.e. the binary size
of the error is less than the binary size of p) it is a somewhat homomorphic system
and is the underlying SHS component in Gentry’s blueprint. For a given function, as
we evaluate the operations in the circuit representation of the function, the error in
each intermediary ciphertext will grow. For this cryptosystem, a polynomial f can
be homomorphically evaluated if
deg(f) ≤ |p|bin − 4− log (‖f‖1)
|ri|bin + 2
, (3.3)
where deg(f) is the degree of f and ‖f‖1 is the 1-norm of the coefficient vector of f
[49].




, we can no longer homomorphically
evaluate the circuit. If, at this point, we could take the intermediary ciphertexts, de-
crypt them to obtain the corresponding plaintexts, and then re-encrypt the plaintexts
we would have “fresh” ciphertexts with small error size again and could continue to
homomorphically evaluate the circuit. This process is known as refreshing the cipher-
texts. One obvious method to accomplish this is to give the secret key to the party
doing the homomorphic evaluation. Then they could periodically decrypt everything
and re-encrypt it while doing the homomorphic evaluation, but this would mean they
could decrypt the original ciphertexts and we would no longer have privacy.
To allow for this refreshing of the ciphertexts while maintaining privacy, we
make the following key observation. The decryption function of the SHS is itself a
function. Specifically, it is a function which takes a ciphertext and the private key as
27
input and returns the original plaintext. If the number of multiplications and addi-
tions in the circuit that represents the decryption function is less than the maximum
number that the SHS can handle then the SHS can homomorphically evaluate its
own decryption circuit. Gentry summarized this concept in what is known as his
bootstrapping theorem in the literature [20].
Theorem 2 (Bootstrapping Theorem)
If a somewhat homomorphic system (SHS) can evaluate the following two circuits
1. A single addition operation followed by decryption.
2. A single multiplication operation followed by decryption.
then it can be bootstrapped into a fully homomorphic system (FHS).
Normally for the secret key p, a plaintext m, and a ciphertext c = E(m), with
a large amount of error we have,
D(c, p) = D(E(m), p)→ m.














E(m) and E(m) are both valid encryptions ofm, but E(m) is a “fresh” ciphertext with
small error. So if we publish an encryption of the secret key, E(p), the party doing
the homomorphic evaluation can encrypt the intermediary ciphertexts (using the
public key) and homomorphically evaluate the decryption circuit to obtain refreshed
ciphertexts. Note that publishing the encryption of the secret key (under the public
key) means that this cryptosystem needs to be circularly secure.
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Recall, that to homomorphically evaluate a function, you represent it as a
Boolean circuit. The circuit normally takes bits as input and produces bits as out-
put. When evaluated homomorphically though, it will take a ciphertext for each bit
and produce a ciphertext for each bit of output by performing the corresponding op-
erations for the addition (XOR) and multiplication (AND) gates on the ciphertexts
as opposed to bits. Decrypting each output bit should yield the result that would
have been obtained by operating directly on the plaintext bits. In other words, in-
stead of taking bits and producing bits it now takes encryptions of bits and produces
encryptions of bits.
There are two things needed to make this concept of ciphertext refreshing
work.
1. The number of multiplications in the decryption circuit must be less than the
maximum number that the SHS can handle.
2. The public key should include an encryption of the secret key to allow for
evaluating the decryption circuit homomorphically.
The decryption function is
D(c, p) = (c mod p) mod 2→ m
which is the same thing as
D(c, p) = LSB(c)⊕ LSB(bc/pe)→ m.
where LSB(a) extracts the least significant bit from a. This can easily be seen because
c mod p = c− bc/pe · p,
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and since p is odd,
(c mod p) mod 2 = c− bc/pe mod 2.
When this function is represented as a Boolean circuit, the complicated part lies
in computing c/p = c · 1/p. When this calculation is done homomorphically over
the binary representation of c and 1/p it takes roughly (|p|bin)2 multiplications (and
some additions) in order to accurately compute it. This will cause the error size of
the ciphertexts to grow by this same factor. Thus, we would need (|p|bin)2|e|bin <
|p|bin to be successful in homomorphically evaluating the decryption circuit, which is
impossible.
To reduce the number of multiplications in the decryption circuit, a squashing
technique must be employed. This is accomplished by publishing a hint about the
private key of the SHS (or in this case a hint about 1/p) in the public key. To this
end, we modify the KeyGen algorithm to run as follows and add in the encryptions
of the secret key as well. Note that for a rational number x, the expression x mod 2
maps x into the interval [0, 2). For example, 7.1317 mod 2→ 1.1317.
1. Generate the secret key p and the public values xi as before.
2. Generate rational (decimal) numbers bi ← [0, 2) with α bits of precision to form
the set B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn}.
3. Find, by possibly adjusting one (or more) of the bi values, a sparse subset
S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} of size r such that
∑
i∈S
bi = 1/p− ε mod 2, where |ε| < 2−α.
4. Encode S as a vector s having s[i] = 1 if i ∈ S and s[i] = 0 otherwise (i.e. an
indicator vector for S).
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5. The secret key is now s.
6. The xi’s and B are published as the public key.
7. Also, publish zi = E(s[i]), the encryption of the bits of the secret key, either as
part of the public key or as a separate evaluation key.
In addition, when a plaintext m is encrypted some additional information is appended
to the ciphertext c. Compute d̄i = c ·bi mod 2 for i = 1, 2, . . . n so that the ciphertext




d̄1, d̄2, . . . , d̄n
])
. For each d̄i only l = dlog (r)e+3 bits of precision
after the binary decimal point are stored.










This enables us to replace the multiplications involved with computing 1/p
with a small number of additions. We now describe the full details of the circuit used
to compute the decryption function. To do so, we need a few preliminaries.
First, recall the definition of the elementary symmetric polynomials.
Definition 4 (Elementary Symmetric Polynomials)
Let e0(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1, and for any integer k > 0 define






where S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Note, ek is of degree k and oftentimes if x is a vector with
components x1, x2, . . . , xn we denote ek(x1, x2, . . . , xn) as ek(x).
Second, we will need Lucas’ Theorem which holds in general for any prime p,
but for our purposes we only need the case when p = 2.
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Theorem 3 (Lucas’ Theorem for p = 2)
Let n and m be integers with n ≤ m, where
m = m0 +m1 · 2 +m2 · 22 + . . .
n = n0 + n1 · 2 + n2 · 22 + . . .
















. . . mod 2.










≡ mi mod 2.
Third, a well known result (Lemma 11 in [6]) shows that for a binary vector
x with Hamming weight w, the bits of w can be represented as a polynomial in the
x[i]’s.
Theorem 4 (Bits of the Hamming Weight)
For a binary vector x with Hamming weight w, where (wn, wn−1, . . . , w1, w0) is the
binary representation of w with w0 being the least significant bit. Then
wi = e2i(x) mod 2.














≡ wi mod 2
where the first line (assuming e2i is evaluated over the integers) is due to exactly w





terms in e2i(x) which are 1 and the second line
holds due to Lucas’ Theorem.
Fourth, we will need a trick that allows us to replace the sum of 3 numbers of
a certain bit length with the sum of two numbers having a bit length of at most 1 bit
longer than the longest one.
Definition 5 (Three-for-Two Trick)
Consider three t-bit numbers a, b, c having binary representations as follows
a = (at−1, . . . , a1, a0)
b = (bt−1, . . . , b1, b0)
c = (ct−1, . . . , c1, c0).
Then define two (t+ 1)-bit numbers m,n based on the following bit-wise formulas
n0 = 0
mi = ai + bi + ci mod 2
ni+1 = aibi + aici + bici mod 2
mt = 0.
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In essence, the bits of n hold the carry bits from the addition. This can be computed
by the following circuit which has a multiplicative depth of 2.
Figure 3.1: Three for Two Circuit
For the sum of k numbers, this three-for-two trick can be applied repeatedly to
reduce the sum to the sum of two numbers. It will take at most dlog3/2(k)e+ 2 rounds
to do so, which corresponds to a polynomial of degree at most 2dlog3/2(k)e+2.
Following the same lines as the corresponding discussion in [49] we break the
evaluation of the decryption function up into 3 sections and describe the circuit needed
to handle each section.
Section 1
Compute ai = s[i] · di for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Since s[i] are bits and di are ratio-
nal numbers in [0, 2) this can be done with the following circuit which has a
multiplicative depth of 1.
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Figure 3.2: Section 1 Circuit
Thus each bit of the output is a degree 2 polynomial in the inputs: ai(j) =
s[i] · di(j).
Section 2
Next, compute the sum
n∑
i=1
ai. This is done using what Gentry calls the “grade-
school” arithmetic approach. Each addend ai in this sum is represented in
binary and entered as a row in the following table. Then the sum (as an integer)
of the j-th column is stored in Wj (without any carrying to the next column).
Note that this is just the Hamming weight of the column.
a1(l) . . . a1(j) . . . a1(1) a1(0)





+ an(l) . . . an(j) . . . an(1) an(0)
Wl . . . Wj . . . W1 W0
Table 3.3: Grade School Arithmetic
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Since only r of the si values are 1, only r of the values: {a1(j), a2(j), . . . , an(j)}
are possibly non-zero for each column so Wj ≤ r. This means, we can represent
Wj in binary using at most h = dlog(r + 1)e binary digits. From the theorem
above, each bit of Wj can be represented as a polynomial of degree 2
j in the
bits a1(j), a2(j), . . . , an(j).
Wj(k) = e2k(a1(j), a2(j), . . . , an(j)) mod 2
The polynomial for the (h − 1)-th bit will require the largest polynomial of
degree 2h−1 = 2dlog(r+1)e−1 < 2log(r) = r so the circuit that computes the bits of
Wj will have a multiplicative depth of dlog (r)e.
Section 3
To compute the sum
l+1∑
j=0
2j−(l+1)Wj, which is equal to
n∑
i=1
ai, let wj = 2
j−(l+1)Wj
so the sum becomes
l+1∑
j=0
wj. We now repeatedly use the three-for-two trick shown




since we are looking for the sum mod 2 the numbers never grow to have more
than l+ 1 bits in total since we can discard the “carry bits” for the 2’s position.
As noted above, this corresponds to a polynomial of degree at most
2dlog3/2(l+1)e+2 < 2log3/2(l+1)+3 = 8 · 2
log(l+1)
log(3/2) = 8(l + 1)1/ log(3/2).
Now, to add the final two numbers y1 and y2 together, which are (l + 1)-bit
numbers we normally would use a circuit that is of size dlog(l + 1)e. However,
since we want by1 + y2e mod 2 they show that since
n∑
i=1
s[i]di is within 1/4 of
an integer that by1 + y2e mod 2 can be computed by a degree 4 polynomial.
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Adding the final gates to compute c− by1 + y2e mod 2 does not introduce any
multiplications so the circuit for this section corresponds to a polynomial of
degree at most 32(l + 1)1/ log(3/2).
In total, we have that the circuit in Section 1 corresponds to a degree 2 poly-
nomial, the circuit in Section 2 corresponds to an r degree polynomial, and the cir-
cuit in Section 3 corresponds to a 32(l + 1)1/ log(3/2) degree polynomial. Putting this
together implies that the decryption circuit corresponds to a polynomial of degree
64r(l + 1)1/ log(3/2). Let f be the polynomial corresponding to the circuit composed
of a single operation (multiplication or addition) followed by the decryption circuit.
We now obtain the following bound on the degree of f .
deg(f) ≤ 2 · 64r(l + 1)1/ log(3/2)
≤ 128λ
(
(dlog(r) + 3e) + 1
)1.71
≤ 128λ(dlog(λ) + 4e)1.71
≤ 128λ log2(λ)
where the second inequality holds if we set r = λ. Recall from the bound (3.3) above
that for a polynomial f we need
deg(f) ≤ |p|bin − 4− log (‖f‖1)
|ri|bin + 2
.
to be able to homomorphically evaluate f . We set |ri|bin = λ to avoid brute force
attacks on the noise. We compute log(‖f‖1) as follows. Since f is a polynomial in





≤ n128λ log2(λ) monomial
terms. Since f is a polynomial over F2 each coefficient can be at most 1 and we have
‖f‖1 ≤ n128λ log
2(λ). Taking the logarithm of this expression (and noting that n ≤ λ7)
37
yields
log(‖f‖1) ≤ 128λ log2(λ) log(n)
≤ 128λ log2(λ) · 7 log(λ)
≤ 896λ log3(λ).
Setting |p|bin ≥ Cλ2 log2(λ) for some constant C > 128 we have that
|p|bin − 4− log (‖f‖1)
|ri|bin + 2
≥ Cλ





and so the system can evaluate f and by Gentry’s Bootstrapping Theorem (Theorem
2 above) is a fully homomorphic system.
To summarize, the SHS will correctly homomorphically evaluate any circuit
where |e|bin < |p|bin in the final output. When starting with fresh ciphertexts, the
output of performing a single operation and then evaluating the squashed decryption
circuit will satisfy that requirement. The process for doing so (often called recrypt
or refresh) is outlined below.




d̄1, d̄2, . . . , d̄n
])
with large error we wish to obtain a
fresh ciphertext with small error.
2. Let (ct, . . . , c1, c0) be the binary representation for the integer c, and define
yi = E(c(i)) for i = 0, 1, . . . , t (i.e. the encryption of the i-th bit of the integer
c using the public key SHS system encryption function without the appended
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list of extra info).
3. Let (di(l), . . . , di(1), di(0)) be the binary representation for the decimal number
di, and define gi,j = E(di(j)) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 0, 1, . . . , l (again, just
the integer part of the encryption). Note, that one can use the bits di(j) directly
as the integer ciphertexts, since technically they are valid encryptions when the
chosen subset of the xi’s is empty and the error term is 0.
4. Evaluate the decryption circuit over the integers using the integer values yi, gi,j,
and zi (from the public key) in place of the bits c(i), di(j), and s[i] respectively
in the circuit.
5. The output of this evaluation will be a single integer that is a fresh ciphertext
with small error. The di values for this new encryption can be calculated using
the bi’s in the public key.
This process of homomorphically evaluating the decryption circuit (or some
squashed version of it) is referred to as bootstrapping since the cryptosystem uses its
existing somewhat homomorphic properties to transform into a fully homomorphic
cryptosystem.
We summarize the completed fully homomorphic system below.
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s is an indicator vector
xi = qip+ ri



















Table 3.4: Gentry Public Key Cryptosystem
3.2.2 Improvements to Gentry Systems
The cryptosystem presented in Gentry’s thesis [20] used ideal lattices instead
of integers. Basically, the secret key p and errors that are multiples of 2 are replaced
with the basis for a secret ideal I and a basis for another (public) ideal J that the
errors come from. One of the disadvantages of this approach is that generating out
the bases for these ideals is quite computationally intensive.
One of the first attempts to improve Gentry’s system was by Smart and Ver-
cauteren [47]. They reduced the public and private key sizes by using integers instead
of ideal lattice bases. To do so, they used a principal ideal lattice, which could be
represented by two large integers. Unfortunately, the complexity of the KeyGen pro-
cedure was such that not only did it take a while (several hours in their experiments)
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to generate out the keys for lattices of dimension < 211 (having associated security
parameter λ = 54) it was unable to generate out keys for bigger lattices. In order
to bootstrap the somewhat homomorphic system into a fully homomorphic system,
lattices of dimension 227 were needed and so while in theory the system was fully
homomorphic it was never so in practice.
In late 2010, Gentry and Halevi [22] revisited the Smart and Vercauteren
approach and were able to achieve bootstrapping leading to a fully homomorphic
system. They did so by eliminating the requirement that the resultant of a couple
of polynomials used in the KeyGen process be prime and squashing the decryption
circuit from a polynomial in several hundred degrees to a polynomial of degree 15.
The van Dijk integer [49] version is the example presented above. This scheme
deviated from the previous ones by using lattices for security assumptions, but using
simple arithmetic of integers in implementation.
In 2011, Coron improved on this integer version [16] and reduced the public
key size from O(λ10) down to O(λ7). The main contributions were as follows. First,
in the system described in detail above the public key contains τ integers. However,
these integers could be represented by only 2
√
τ integers if they were formed as the
product of integers xi,j = xi,0 · xj,1 mod x0 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d
√
τe. Thus a quadratic,
as opposed to a linear representation, of the public key elements results in significant
space savings since instead of O(λ5) numbers in the public key there are now O(λ2.5).
Second, there are O(λ8) hints, bi, in the public key, but instead of storing all of them
one can provide a seed for a public random number generator (RNG) and use the
RNG to generate the bi’s on the fly. This trade off of space in the public key for
a fixed amount of computation by the party doing the homomorphic computation
is quite reasonable. Often the party doing the computation has access to massive
amounts of computation and conceivably the network and the storage space on the
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users end are the main bottlenecks in the system.
Another interesting approach is provided by Coron in [17]. He observes that if
one is willing to sacrifice the notion of fully homomorphic encryption to allow for the
evaluation of functions having a fixed maximum number of levels, L, in their circuit
representation then a very efficient cryptosystem can be achieved using the somewhat
homomorphic system and a technique called modulus switching. In short, modulus
switching which Coron adapts from [10] allows a ciphertext in Zq1 with a large amount
of error to be turned into a ciphertext in Zq2 , where q2 < q1, with a small amount of
error. This process is invoked after each level of circuit computation to “clean up”
the ciphertexts. This obviates the need for homomorphic evaluation of the decryption
circuit so a squashed decryption circuit is no longer needed and bootstrapping is also
not required (though it can be used as an optimization feature). The sequence, or
ladder, of decreasing moduli q1, q2, . . . , qL with qi+1 < qi must be included in the
public key. However, since we do not have to provide a “hint” about the secret key
anymore the size of the public key decreases drastically. The KeyGen algorithm is
also much faster, but the Recrypt process will take longer since the homomorphic
evaluation will have to “walk” down the ladder of descending moduli for every single
operation.
Note that the ratio of the error size to the size of the ciphertext remains
unchanged. This cryptosystem is an example of a leveled scheme in that the limit on
the multiplications is not on the number of operations, but on the number of levels
in the circuit representation.
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Scheme λ Public Key Key Gen Recrypt
Smart-Vercauteren [22] ≈72 3.01 MB 3.2 min N/A
Gentry-Halevi [22] ≈72 2.25 GB 2.2 hours 31 min
van Dijk Integer version [49] 72 λ10 N/A N/A
Coron Integer (quad) [16] 72 λ7 (802 MB) 43 min 14 min 33 sec
Leveled [17] 72 λ5 (18 MB) 6 min 18s 2 hour 27 min
Table 3.5: Summary of Gentry Approach Cryptosystems
1. Note that the Smart-Vercauteren system in not fully homomorphic.
2. Smart-Vercauteren timings done with a 64-bit quad core Intel Xeon at 3GHz
and 24GB of RAM.
3. Integer timings done on a single core Intel Core2 Duo at about 3GHz.
3.2.3 Security of Gentry Systems
The security of Gentry’s original system and those that follow his blueprint is
based on the hardness of the A-GCD problem. In Gentry’s PhD thesis he showed that
the security of his cryptosystem is based on the Ideal Coset Problem (the A-GCD
equivalent when dealing with ideals in a ring) or the decisional BDDP (the A-GCD
equivalent for ideal lattices). One of the crucial components in his statement of the
BDDP problem is the method of generating a sample from a set of lattice points. If
this sampling technique has low minimum entropy then the BDDP should be hard.
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While the problems themselves are assumed to be hard for general lattices, it is not
clear in the research community whether they still remain hard for ideal lattices.
Perhaps the special structure of an ideal lattice actually renders these problems easy
to solve.
3.3 LWE Approach
The security assumptions of Gentry’s original approach were based on the
hardness of lattice problems over ideal lattices. The improvements discussed above
did much to improve other elements of Gentry’s original system (mainly in terms
of space and the time it takes to evaluate a circuit), but their security still relied
on the hardness of solving these problems over ideal lattices. In 2011, in an effort
to base the security assumptions on more stable theoretical ground, Brakerski and
Vaikuntanathan in [10] proposed a fully homomorphic system which used the LWE
problem as a basis for their security. As discussed when originally introduced, the
LWE problem can be reduced to solving gapSVP over general lattices so this avoids
the extra assumption that the problem is hard for ideal lattices.
An additional feature in this paper is that they avoid the need to squash the
decryption circuit by introducing a dimension reduction technique. The following is
an overview of the system they proposed.
We first present a SHS that can handle up to D multiplications and then
discuss how it can be developed into a FHS via bootstrapping. The user chooses a
secret key s ∈ Znq to be the secret key for the system. A plaintext is a single bit
m. To encrypt the message m and obtain a ciphertext c, the user chooses a ∈ Znq
uniform randomly and e ∈ Zq according to a distribution (the error distribution). This
sampling is done independently for each encryption and generates the ciphertext as
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follows.
1. Compute b = 〈a, s〉+ 2e+m
2. Output the ciphertext c = (a, b) ∈ Znq × Zq
The random e in the encryption process is often referred to as the error or noise, and
should be “small” relative to q. The error distribution is said to be a B-bounded
distribution meaning that Pr[|e| > B] is vanishingly small.
The decryption procedure is outlined below.
1. Extract a and b from c.
2. Using the secret key s, recover m as follows:
(b− 〈a, s〉 mod q) mod 2 = (2e+m) mod 2
= m.




. Thus, (2e+m mod q) =
2e+m.
In fact, instead of viewing each ciphertext as a tuple, we can think of the
ciphertext as a linear multivariate polynomial in Zq[x1, x2, . . . , xn] with n + 1 terms
having b, a[1], a[2], . . . , a[2] as coefficients and x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) being the vector
whose i-th component is the symbolic variable xi.




a[i] · x[i] ∈ Zq[x1, x2, . . . , xn]
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a[i] · x[i] ∈ Zq[x1, x2, . . . , xn]
= f [c](x)
and decryption is done by evaluating the ciphertext polynomial at s and taking the
result mod 2:
D(c, s) = f [c](s) mod 2.
This simple system is clearly additively homomorphic. Given two ciphertext
polynomials f [c1](x) and f [c2](x) one can add them together to obtain







































(a1,i + a2,i) · xi
)
= (b1 + b2)−
n∑
i=1
(a1[i] + a2[i]) · x[i]
= f [c1 + c2](x)





. Taking a linear
combination of t ciphertext polynomials with coefficients gi (the coefficient vector is
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g = (g1, g2, . . . , gl)) we have that
t∑
i=1





















gi (〈ai, s〉 − 〈ai,x〉) .
If we evaluate this expression at s we obtain
t∑
i=1







































































































The system is also multiplicatively homomorphic, but it is not quite as straight-
forward to see. Multiplying two ciphertext polynomials produces the following ex-
pression





































































f [c1](x) · f [c2](x) =
(
〈a1, s〉 · 〈a2, s〉+ 2e2〈a1, s〉+m2〈a1, s〉
+ 2e1〈a2, s〉+ 4e1e2 + 2e1m2
+m1〈a2, s〉+ 2e2m1 +m1m2
)
− 〈a1, s〉 · 〈a2,x〉 − 2e1〈a2,x〉 −m1〈a2,x〉
− 〈a2, s〉 · 〈a1,x〉 − 2e2〈a1,x〉 −m2〈a1,x〉
+ 〈a1,x〉 · 〈a2,x〉






the terms with inner products will cancel when the ciphertext polynomial is evaluated
at s. In a more concise fashion, we see that the above ciphertext polynomial for the
product is now quadratic and can be written as
f [c1](x) · f [c2](x) = h0 +
n∑
i=1





hi,j · x[i]x[j] (3.5)
for some coefficients, hi and hi,j, with h0 = b1b2. However, this new ciphertext
polynomial has grown in degree and will continue to do so every time a multiplication
operation is evaluated. This violates the desired property of compactness in the
ciphertexts, which requires that a ciphertext which has been used in a homomorphic
operation be the same size as a fresh ciphertext.
To alleviate this problem, the authors do something similar to what Gentry
did in his original approach when he squashed the decryption circuit to reduce its
complexity. (Though in this case, they are not squashing the decryption circuit, but
rather modifying the ciphertext.) They include a “hint” about the secret key s in
the public key. This hint is the quadratic terms s[i]s[j], with i < j, and the linear
terms s[i] “pseudo-encrypted” under a new secret key t. (They are pseudo-encryptions
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since normally bits are encrypted, but here they “encrypt” integers.) The pseudo-
encryptions of these hints look like the following:
E(s[i], t) =
(





〈āi, t〉+ 2ēi + s[i]
)
− 〈āi, t〉 = s[i] + 2ēi
E(s[i]s[j], t) =
(





〈āi,j, t〉+ 2ēi,j + s[i]s[j]
)
− 〈āi,j, t〉 = s[i]s[j] + 2ēi,j.
Substituting the pseudo-encryptions of the secret key components in for x[i] and x[i]x[j]
in (3.5) we obtain a new ciphertext polynomial for the product





















This expression is once again a linear function, but now it is an encryption of m1m2
under t. This process, not surprisingly, is called re-linearization. The encryption
under t is slightly more noisy than the original encryption under s,









= m1m2 + 2
(











The approximation will be a valid encryption of m1m2 provided that the mag-





. One concern is that since hi ∈ Zq,
the noise due to hiēi is of binary size |ei|bin +blog (q)c, which may be quite large (sim-
ilar concerns exist for hi,j ēi,j). To avoid this trouble, instead of publishing pseudo-
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encryptions of the linear and quadratic terms of s in an attempt to approximate hisi


















This allows them to publish pseudo-encryptions of multiples of the linear and quadratic
terms so that only a sum of the noise is introduced rather than the product of the
noise with an element in Zq. (Basically, instead of having hi multiplied by a small
error term resulting in a potentially large total error term, we have a sum of small
error terms, one for each bit of hi, resulting in a much smaller total error term.)
More precisely the following values will replace the pseudo-encryptions of the linear




















The ciphertext polynomial for the product is now
























and the evaluation at t of the ciphertext polynomial for the product becomes
f [c1c2](t) = m1m2 + 2
(
















From this expression, we see that the binary size of the noise in the new ciphertext





(blog (q)c+ 1) |ei,r|bin
)
.
More rigorously, if we assume that |ei| ≤ E for i = 1, 2 (input noise) and that
|ei,r| < B and |ei,j,r| < B (fresh noise), then the noise in the product ciphertext is
bounded by











≤ 3E2 + n2 (blog (q)c+ 1)B
≤ 3E2n2 (blog (q)c+ 1)B (3.6)
where the second to last line holds assuming that E ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
For a system that will handle L levels of multiplication, we need a new key for
each level to enable us to re-linearize the ciphertext polynomial for any product. The
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KeyGen algorithm will produce a sequence of keys: s0, s1, . . . , sL that form the secret
key chain, and will publish the encryption of the bits of the linear and quadratic terms
of each si encrypted under si+1 as the public key. In addition, each ciphertext will
be tagged with a label from 0 to L indicating what key it is encrypted under. The
error growth due to multiplications is the dominant factor that governs how large L
can be before the ciphertexts become too noisy for the re-linearization technique to
work. It turns out that it is possible to obtain L = nε for any ε < 1.
To compute the product of D ciphertexts, we need a circuit with L = dlog (D)e
levels. Assuming that |ei| ≤ E for each ciphertext and using the bound 3.6 recursively,
let Ei be the noise after level i so that we have the following:
E1 ≤ 3E2n2 (blog (q)c+ 1)B
E2 ≤ 3E21n2 (blog (q)c+ 1)B
≤ 3
(
3E2n2 (blog (q)c+ 1)B
)2
n2 (blog (q)c+ 1)B





3n2 (blog (q)c+ 1)B
)2L−1
.
When computing the product of D ciphertexts (i.e. L = dlog (D)e) we have the
following bound on the noise in the ciphertext polynomial for the product
D-product noise ≤ E2dlog (D)e
(




3n2 (log (q) + 1)B
)2D−1
. (3.7)
The system as described so far is a SHS and is summarized below.
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Decrypt c and sl
for some level l
m f [c](sl) mod 2
Table 3.6: LWE Symmetric Key SHS
To homomorphically evaluate a function on encrypted data using this SHS,
one breaks the circuit representation of the function up into levels where the bits of
the intermediate results are involved in at most a single multiplication of the input
bits. After each level, all these intermediate results (including those involved only in
additions) are re-linearized and evaluation proceeds with the next level. This is done
so that each level starts with inputs that are encrypted under the same key.
When using results from a higher level than the previous one, it may be neces-
sary to perform “blank homomorphic operations” to bring the key level of the cipher-
text polynomial to the correct level. This is done by performing the re-linearization
technique on the ciphertext polynomial (several times possibly), though of course
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there will not be any quadratic terms in a valid ciphertext polynomial.
Given a ciphertext polynomial f [c](x) under a key sl we can transform it into
a ciphertext polynomial under sl+1 as follows:


















When this new ciphertext is evaluated at sl+1, we have















































From this error term, we obtain the following bound on the increase in noise when
performing a single blank homomorphic operation. Note that |ēi,r| ≤ B since they
are fresh pseudo-encryptions in the public key
blank noise increase ≤ n (blog (q)c+ 1)B. (3.8)
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Since we can always perform these blank homomorphic operations on a ciphertext,
the decryption circuit will take as input a ciphertext with label L, the maximum level
that the system can handle.
To turn the system into a FHS we need to be able to encrypt bits without
knowing the secret key. To this end we modify the symmetric key SHS from above
to obtain a public key SHS. First, the KeyGen algorithm now includes the following
additional steps.
1. Choose a matrix A ∈ Zd×nq uniform randomly.
2. Choose a vector e ∈ Zdq according to the error distribution.
3. Compute b = As0 + 2e ∈ Zdq .
4. Publish A and b as the public keys for encryption.
Second, the Encryption algorithm is modified as follows to encrypt a bit m.
1. Choose r ∈ Zd2 uniform randomly.
2. Compute a = ATr.
3. Compute b = bTr +m.




The revised system is summarized below.
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si and A are chosen
uniform randomly
e is chosen from
the error distribution
b = As0 + 2e
Encrypt plaintext (m) ciphertext(
f [c](x) ∈ Zq[x]
) r is chosen
uniform randomly
a = ATr
b = bTr +m




Decrypt c and sL m f [c](sL) mod 2
Table 3.7: LWE Public Key SHS
Note, the following points about this system. First, we can assume that the Decrypt
function always has inputs which are ciphertexts under SL, since if they are not, one
can always perform blank homomorphic operations to bring them to level L. Second,
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a fresh ciphertext polynomial has noise bounded by
level 0 noise = eTr
≤ dB. (3.9)
Now we derive a bound on when we can homomorphically evaluate a polyno-
mial g(x1, x2, . . . , xl) ∈ Z2[x1, x2, . . . , xl] with degree D.
1. Assume |ei| ≤ E for each input to g.
2. Since the degree of g is D, the error in each monomial in g is bounded by
monomial noise = Ê ≤ E2D
(
3n2 (log (q) + 1)B
)2D−1
.






monomial terms. Also, since g is a function over F2 each coefficient can be at
most 1 so ‖g‖1 ≤ lD. This means the error in the sum of the monomial terms
is bounded by
















4. Now to decrypt this ciphertext we may need to perform several blank homo-
morphic operations to bring the level to L. Using the bound 3.8 at most L
times we have
blank noise increase for g ≤ Ln (blog (q)c+ 1)B.
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5. Combining the above together and using the fact that E ≤ dB for the public
key system, we see that


























3n2 (log (q) + 1)B
)2D−1




3dn2 (log (q) + 1)
)2D
















For any constant C1 ∈ N and ε ∈ (0, 1), we can set the parameters as follows to satisfy
(3.10).
n ≥ λ L = nε
q = 2L D =
CL
log(n)
l = nC1 B = n
C =
1
3(C1 + 10 + 2 log(12) + 4ε)
d = n log(q) + 2λ
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Plugging these values into (3.10) we verify that
lDLB4D−1
(
































where the fifth line holds if L ≥ 2, the eighth line holds since n > 2, and the final
lines holds if L ≥ 4. Note, that for circuits with L < 4 it can be shown directly that
they satisfy the bound, but due to our overestimating throughout the derivation we
cannot conclude that from this result. However, once we do that, we conclude that
this SHS can evaluate any polynomial of degree D on l variables in Z2.
To obtain a FHS, we need to be able to evaluate the decryption function with
less than L levels of multiplication in order to do bootstrapping. Unfortunately, the
decryption function requires at least max (n, log q) levels of multiplication (due to the
computation of 〈a, s〉) which will be greater than L since L = nε < n. To handle this
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difficulty they introduce a dimension reduction technique. First, notice that in the
previous discussion on re-linearization, the second secret key t could have had dimen-
sion smaller than n say k. Second, for some p < q we can approximate elements in Zq
with elements in Zp by scaling the elements down. Using these two notions, they are
able to reduce the complexity of the decryption function to have about max (k, log p)
levels of multiplication which is less than L. Once the decryption function can be
processed by the SHS, bootstrapping can be applied in the same manner as described
in Gentry’s approach above and they obtain a FHS. (The encryptions of the bits
of sL under s0 are added to the public key so that homomorphic evaluation of the
decryption circuit can produce “fresh” ciphertexts under s0.) One advantage of this
approach is that the bits of one of the secret keys are never encrypted under the same
secret key. Rather they are encrypted under a new secret key (the next one in the
chain) so they need only assume that the system is weakly circular secure.
In the paper, the authors note that the bootstrapping step can be accomplished
without squashing the decryption circuit, but in essence they have just repurposed
the hint in the public key from helping decrease the complexity of the decryption
circuit (squashing in Gentry based approaches) to preventing the expansion of the
ciphertexts during multiplication operations (re-linearization in this approach) and
shortening the ciphertexts at the end (dimension reduction) to make the decryption
circuit smaller.
3.3.1 Improvements to LWE Systems
Following up quickly on his work earlier in the year, Brakerski in [11] demon-
strates a cryptosystem that uses the Ring-LWE problem, or polynomial LWE (PLWE)
as they refer to it, as a security basis. The Ring-LWE problem is the natural analog
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of the standard LWE problem but phrased in terms of polynomial rings. It was first
posed in [33] and is defined as follows.
Problem 11 (Ring Learning With Errors Problem (Ring-LWE))
Given poly(n) samples of the form
(
a(x), b(x) = a(x) ·s(x)+e(x)
)
where a(x), s(x) ∈
Zq[x]/(xn+1) with a(x) being chosen from a uniform random distribution and s(x) be-
ing fixed for all pairs and b(x), e(x) ∈ Z[x]/(xn+1) with e(x) chosen from a Gaussian
distribution centered about 0, determine the value of s(x).
In their paper they actually have s(x) taken from the error distribution, but
they show that this is basically equivalent to selecting s(x) uniformly at random.
The purpose of the Gaussian distribution centered about 0 is to ensure that the error
polynomials, e(x), have “small” coefficients. The main contribution of this work is
creating a system that is provably circularly secure. Previous works based on Gentry’s
original approach all assumed circular security (since they could not prove it) when
they encrypted a hint about the secret key in the public key. They show that their
system is secure when an attacker has access to an encryption of any polynomial
function of the secret key.
In another 2011 paper [8], basically identical to [9], Brakerski showed how
to construct a leveled fully homomorphic system based on Ring-LWE that doesn’t
use bootstrapping. To do so, this paper was the first to introduce the technique of
modulus switching. (This is the technique that Coron adapted in [17] to improve a
Gentry type system.) The modulus switching technique follows from the dimension
reduction idea in [10] that by scaling and rounding carefully, for p < q elements in
Zq can be approximated by elements in Zp. Here the notation [x]m denotes modulus









Definition 6 (Modulus Switching Technique)
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1. [〈c̄, s〉]p ≡ [〈c, s〉]q mod 2
2. |[〈c̄, s〉]p| <
p
q
· |[〈c, s〉]q|+ ‖s‖1
As discussed before, this scaling maintains the ratio of the noise size to cipher-
text size. However, the authors here note that by keeping the noise size down the
rate of increase in the error size is reduced. So this technique is applied after each
ciphertext multiplication in a tradeoff between the modulus size and the error size.
The main focus of this approach is to reduce the per-gate computation. They
note that Gentry based systems require poly(λ) computation, and previous LWE ap-
proaches required O(λ3.5) computation, but this approach requires O(λ·L3) computa-
tion where L is the number of levels in the circuit. Furthermore, using bootstrapping
as an optimization they can actually achieve O(λ2) computation per-gate.
One interesting practical result of this paper is that Shai Halevi has created
a low level C++ implementation of the cryptosystem described in the paper. The
source code is available at https://github.com/shaih/HElib. Unfortunately, as of
August 2014, it does not include the bootstrapping portion yet as the programming
to do so is quite involved.
In 2012, Brakerski proposed a scale invariant homomorphic encryption scheme
in [7] where the noise growth when multiplying ciphertexts grows linearly. He did so
without using modulus switching and the security was classically reduced from the
worst-case hardness of the GapSVP problem.
In 2013, Gentry, Sahai, and Waters proposed an improved version of the LWE
based system that avoided the re-linearization step [23]. In this system, homomor-
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phic operations are carried out with matrix operations leading to a faster and more
simplistic system. Using this scheme, they created the first identity-based fully ho-
momorphic encryption scheme and an attribute-based fully homomorphic encryption
scheme.
3.4 Functional Encryption
As research efforts continued on reducing the size of the ciphertexts and the
amount of computation involved in processing each gate of a circuit, it became clear
that without a major breakthrough fully homomorphic encryption was not feasible
for most situations. This realization prompted the research community to turn its
attention to systems that would be homomorphic for only certain classes of functions
which were presumably functions of interest. For example, the IARPA SPAR project
(solicitation number IARPA-BAA-11-01) was a three and half year project started
in 2011 that asked for researchers to come up with systems that could homomorphi-
cally evaluate some basic SQL commands such as SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and
DELETE on a 10 TB database containing 100 million records.
In addition, researchers recognized challenges that could not be solved by
homomorphic encryption alone. One such example is an oblivious spam filter. In
this situation, a user of a cloud based email system may wish to have the cloud filter
their emails for spam without revealing the contents of their emails to the cloud. At
first glance, this may seem like yet another situation where Homomorphic Encryption
saves the day. The user can publish a public key so that all emails sent to them are
encrypted. The cloud can then homomorphically evaluate their spam identification
function on the encrypted emails. However, the result of this computation will be the
encryption of whether the email is deemed to be spam or not. The user is then faced
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with a problem, either they must interact with the cloud for each email to decrypt
this result and inform the cloud as to whether the email is spam or not (clearly this
will not work) or they can give the cloud their private key and the emails are no
longer private since the cloud can decrypt all the emails as well as the result of their
computation. In this situation, the result of the homomorphic evaluation should be
the result of the function and not an encryption of the result to allow the spam filter
to decide (obliviously) as to whether the email is spam or not.
In the summer of 2013, Shaffi Goldwasser and colleagues [25] proposed a radi-
cally new approach to Homomorphic Encryption which allowed only specific functions,
identified in advance by the holder of the secret key, to be evaluated homomorphically
over any ciphertexts. Basically, the holder of the secret key can generate an access key
for a specific function (or in some cases a family of functions). This access key allows
any user to obtain the plaintext result of applying the function to the encrypted data,
but does not allow the user to obtain the plaintext result of applying any other func-
tion to the encrypted data. The function may be applied to several sets of encrypted
data and the plaintext result will be obtained for each set. This approach is known
as functional encryption, since the access keys are function specific.
The functional encryption scheme proposed by Goldwasser utilizes three key
components: garbled circuits, attribute based encryption, and fully homomorphic
encryption. We now examine the first two components before presenting an overview
of this approach.
3.4.1 Components
Garbled circuits were first introduced by Yao in [51] though he did not use the
specific term. The idea is very similar to homomorphic encryption. For a function f
65
and an input x if one is given a garbled version of the function f̄ and a garbled version
of the input x̄ one should be able to compute f(x). This differs from homomorphic
encryption in that one cannot compute any function on any encrypted data. Rather
for the specific function - data pair (f, x) one can work with the garbled versions to
obtain f(x).
An important component in a garbling scheme is a Double-Key Cipher which
we define below.
Definition 7 (Double-Key Cipher)
A Double-Key Cipher is an encryption scheme that requires 2 k-bit keys to encrypt
and decrypt k-bit strings. For keys a and b and a string m, there is an encryption
function, Ea,b(m) = c, and a decryption function, Da,b(c) = m as usual. Note that
the order of the keys is significant as Ea,b(m) 6= Eb,a(m) and Da,b(c) 6= Db,a(c).
First, we show how to garble a single gate of a circuit. A typical gate in a
circuit looks something like the following (we will use this AND gate to illustrate the
process for our discussion below).
Figure 3.3: AND Gate
Each gate has two incoming wires and an outgoing wire. The initial incoming
wires for the first level of gates are called input wires and the final outgoing wires
for the last level of gates are called output wires. Each wire carries a token, which
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is a k-bit binary string. The tokens encode a one-bit type by having the final bit of
the token be the type. The type of a token is the apparent Boolean value that it
represents and will be visible to the one who is evaluating the garbled circuit.
1. For each wire (incoming and outgoing) select 2 tokens: one of each type.
Wire 1 Wire 2 Wire 3
01100 11010 11010
10101 10001 01111
Table 3.8: Tokens for wires
2. Assign the semantics of 0 to one token and the semantics of 1 to the other token
(the assigned semantics may not correspond to the type). The semantics of a
token is the true Boolean value that it represents and will be hidden from the
one who is evaluating the garbled circuit until the output of the very last level
of gates. We denote a token for wire i with semantics of b as Xbi .
Figure 3.4: AND Gate with Tokens
3. Compute a garbled truth table for the gate where the output is determined
67
by the types of the tokens on the top and bottom incoming wires and is the
encryption under the double key cipher (using the top and bottom tokens as
keys) of the token on the outgoing wire having semantics that correspond to











0 1 EX01 ,X02 (X
0
3 )
0 0 EX01 ,X12 (X
0
3 )
1 1 EX11 ,X02 (X
0
3 )
1 0 EX11 ,X12 (X
1
3 )












Garbled truth table (published)
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Note: in the published truth table, the values in the output column when de-
crypted using the tokens corresponding to the types in the top and bottom col-
umn provide the corresponding token for the outgoing wire (i.e. D01100,10001(01110) =
01111 = X03 , though the evaluator will not know the semantic value)
To garble a function f represent it as a Boolean circuit C. Garble each gate in
C as described above with the exception that for the output wires (i.e. the outgoing
wires in the last level of gates), the type and semantics of each token should match.
To garble an n-bit binary string input m let m̄ = (Xm11 , X
m2
2 , . . . X
mn
n ), where
mi is the i-th bit of m. Here, we assume that the first n wires correspond to the n
bits in the input.
The garbled input, the garbled truth tables for each gate, and the structure of
C are given to the evaluator. The evaluator proceeds gate by gate using the tokens
he knows to recover the token for each outgoing wire. When he reaches the last level
of gates, the type of the tokens on the output wires match their semantics, so the bit
values of f(x) may be readily obtained from the last bits of each token.
Note that as presented above, a garbled circuit is a single use primitive since
knowing another garbled input that differs in even a single bit will leak information
about the tokens that were not revealed during the evaluation of the first garbled
input. The above presentation is adapted from [3].
Attribute-based encryption (ABE), a term coined in [45], is a scheme in which
successful decryption of a ciphertext is dependent on a public attribute associated
with the ciphertext. The following is an overview of the components of such a sys-
tem which will be used in the discussion that follows regarding functional encryp-
tion. Technically, this variant is known as a two-outcome attribute-based encryption
scheme. A predicate is a function having a single bit as output.
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Algorithm Input Output
Setup security parameter (λ) master public key (PK) and
master secret key (sk)
KeyGen predicate (P ) and sk secret key for predicate
(sk P )
Encrypt PK, an attribute (a), and
two messages (m0 and m1)
ciphertext (c)
Decrypt ciphertext and sk P returns m0 if P (a) = 0 and
m1 if P (a) = 1
Table 3.9: Functions in an Attribute-Based Encryption System
Note that the predicate function is a secret.
3.4.2 Goldwasser et al. Approach
Now we are equipped to survey the functional encryption scheme that Gold-
wasser and her colleagues proposed. First, we begin with a fully homomorphic system.
The data c = E(m) is encrypted and a function f is homomorphically evaluated to
obtain the result r = E(f(m)). Second, to recover this result without using the secret
key of the FHS, one could provide a garbled circuit of the decryption circuit with the
secret key hard-coded in. However, to use the garbled circuit, a garbled version of r,
namely the input tokens for the bits of r, are needed and there is no way to know
what the bits of r will be in advance. (Also, note that using this garbled circuit more
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than once will be a problem as discussed above). To solve this conundrum, they use
the third component, attribute-based encryption, as follows. Let Pi be the predicate
that takes c and returns the i-th bit of r. Then, when doing the ABE encrypting,
the attribute is c and m0 = X
0
i and m1 = X
1
i (i.e. the tokens with semantics corre-
sponding to 0 and 1 respectively). Thus, running the ABE decryption algorithm will
return the correct token for the i-bit of r (and only that token). A summary of the
procedure is provided below.
1. The data is encrypted under a fully homomorphic scheme to obtain the cipher-
text c.
2. A function f is selected to be evaluated homomorphically.
3. A garbled version of the FHS decryption circuit (with the fully homomorphic
secret key hardcoded in) is created.
4. The ABE system is initialized and the KeyGen algorithm is run for each of the
n bits that will appear in the output of f using Pi (the predicate that extracts
the i-th bit from r = f(c)) to obtain sk Pi for each one.
5. The ABE encryption function is run for each of the n bits using c as the attribute
and the tokens from the circuit garbling: X0i and X
1
i as m0 and m1 respectively
to produce the ciphertext bi.
6. The end user (think oblivious spam filter) is given c, sk Pi and bi for all i, and
the garbled decryption circuit.
7. The end user evaluates the ABE decryption function on bi and sk Pi for each i
to obtain the tokens: Xr11 , X
r2
2 , . . . , X
rn
n (though he will not know the semantics
ri of the tokens).
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8. Using these tokens, the end user evaluates the garbled decryption circuit and
obtains the (plaintext) result.
This system requires that the function f be processed by the holder of the
private data before any computation can take place. Each time a function is processed,
a new garbled circuit will be generated for the decryption circuit so the garbled circuit
is still a one-time use primitive. However, in their paper Goldwasser et al. showed




Homomorphic encryption has many potential applications since it allows one
to securely delegate the processing of sensitive data to an untrusted party. With the
advent of cloud computing, the need for such methods is increasing rapidly. The fol-
lowing examples provide an insight into the wide range of possible applications. Some
applications have already been implemented in practice but most are still infeasible
due to the inefficiencies of homomorphic encryption. In many of the situations a FHS
could be replaced by a SHS if there is an apriori bound on the complexity of the
desired computations.
4.1 Private Information Retrieval
The most common situation where homomorphic encryption can be used is
in a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) system. Suppose you have some sensitive
business information stored in a database that you do not want to allow others to view.
However, you would like to have the database stored and managed by some other
company that specializes in data management. If an efficient homomorphic scheme
73
was available, you could encrypt your data and send it to the data management
company. They could then host your database and even run queries on it for you.
From their perspective, the data would remain encrypted at all times and the results
they obtain from running a query for you would be encrypted as well. In essence, they
would receive gibberish from you (your encrypted data), they would run a query on
the gibberish, which would produce some gibberish results, and they would then send
you these results. You would then decrypt these results to obtain the result of running
the same query on your unencrypted data. The Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) in the U.S. recently announced plans to spend $20 million USD
over a five year period to develop such methods to store and manipulate encrypted
data.
A PIR instance is formally defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Private Information Retrieval (PIR))
A two party protocol which allows a user to retrieve a subset of the records held by a
server without revealing to the server which of the records were retrieved.
4.1.1 Private Human Genome Sequencing
Another PIR application is providing privacy for distributed computation per-
formed by computers using their spare clock cycles. There are several fairly well
known projects such as the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search (GIMPS) and
Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI@home) that utilize the spare clock cy-
cles of their user base to perform massive amounts of computation. Now that scientists
have mapped out the human genome it is becoming increasingly popular and inex-
pensive to have genomes sequenced for the general public. To bring the cost down
even more, an open source effort similar to those mentioned above could be created
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to map any persons DNA. While privacy may not matter too much when searching
for large prime numbers or aliens, it is of great concern when dealing with something
as personal as your own DNA. The process would look something like the following.
1. A user encrypts their raw DNA data under a homomorphic system.
2. This data is distributed to the many computers on the network and each one
homomorphically evaluates the function to map out the genome data. The
resulting information is combined together and returned to the user.
3. The user decrypts the result to obtain their sequenced genome.
The most computationally expensive part of DNA sequencing is the error
detection and fragment matching performed at the end of the process. This is the
part that can be distributed as described above.
4.1.2 Delegation of Computationally Intensive Processing
PIR applications are also very useful for mobile phones or other low powered
devices that might want to run powerful applications but lack the resources to do
so. Using homomorphic encryption they can hand off any computationally intensive
processing to some server and then display the results on the local device. All the
while being assured that they have not compromised the security or privacy of their
information. For example, one such use case involves an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV). The smallest UAV is a backpack sized object used by the military to provide
reconnaissance during operations. It is launched into the air by hand and can remain
airborne for a couple of hours. Due to its size and power constraints the UAV’s
computer uses most of its clock cycles to keep the vehicle in the air and operate the
radio and other sensors. The UAV may be capturing real time video and need to make
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decisions based on information obtained from it. However, the algorithms to do image
detection on the video and other sophisticated processing for object identification are
too complex to be handled by the onboard processor. Additionally, the UAV may
not always be able to connect to the data network of its source country, due to being
too far away or a network going down during battle. So, the UAV would like to be
able to outsource this video processing to any of the coalition partners of its source
country. This can be done as follows.
1. The UAV encrypts all of the video data it collects using a fully homomorphic
system.
2. The UAV broadcasts this information to any coalition partner network that is
available to process the data.
3. The coalition partner runs the various algorithms on the encrypted video data
and sends the (encrypted) result back to the UAV.
4. The UAV can then decrypt the data and act accordingly.
This approach has a couple of nice side benefits. First, the UAV can change its
encryption key whenever it is concerned that it may have been compromised without
doing a key exchange. Second, as it moves spatially over the field of operation it can
hop from network to network (or even parallelize the processing by using multiple
coalition parties) since it is not tied to using a single base station for processing.
4.1.3 Optimized Cloud Computation
In [38], several Microsoft researchers propose a novel scheme to offload compu-
tation to the cloud securely. As pointed out previously, one of the biggest drawbacks
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to homomorphic encryption is the large size of the ciphertexts. The steps for a client
to send data M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} to the cloud for processing are as follows.
1. The client encrypts all mi under a FHS and sends these ciphertexts to the cloud.
2. For each query, the client encrypts the parameters under the FHS and sends
them to the cloud.
3. The cloud homomorphically evaluates the query using the encrypted parameters
and database that it received from the client.
4. The result of the evaluation is a FHS ciphertext that is sent back to the client.
5. The client decrypts the FHS ciphertext to obtain the plaintext result.
In this situation, all of the transmission across the network is in the form of
large FHS ciphertexts. In some cases, the transmission of the data may take longer
than the processing of the data. To reduce the amount of network traffic needed to
offload data processing to the cloud, the authors propose the following scheme.
1. The client selects a key KAES for use in an AES system, and a key KFHS for a
FHS.
2. The client encrypts KAES under the FHS to obtain K̄ = EFHS(KAES).
3. The database is encrypted with AES using KAES.
4. K̄ and the encrypted database are sent to the cloud in a one-time setup phase.












for each database entry mi. This results in the database being encrypted under
the FHS key KFHS. To see that this is the case, note that the AES circuit























6. For each query, the client encrypts the parameters under the AES key and sends
them to the cloud.
7. The cloud “upgrades” the AES encrypted parameters to be encrypted under
the FHS (just like how the database was upgraded in step 5) and then homo-
morphically evaluates the query.
8. The result of the evaluation is a FHS ciphertext. This could be sent back to
the client, but the goal is to avoid transmitting lengthy FHS ciphertexts across
the network if possible. In the paper, the authors propose using an LWE based
system as the FHS. In this case, by applying the dimension reduction technique
to the FHS ciphertext they can reduce the size drastically and send the shorter
ciphertext to the client. This ciphertext is decryptable, but cannot have any
more operations performed homomorphically. This is not a problem since the
ciphertext is the final output and will only be decrypted.
9. The client receives either the full FHS ciphertext or some shortened version and
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decrypts it to obtain the plaintext result.
In this scenario, there is only one FHS ciphertext sent across the network (during the
setup phase). All other transmissions are ciphertexts encrypted under AES which
are considerably smaller than if they were FHS ciphertexts. This approach trades off
a considerable amount of network transmission at the cost of several homomorphic
evaluations on the server side. Once again, the server is likely to be quite powerful
and this tradeoff is probably an improvement over the original scheme.
4.2 Privacy Preserving Computations
4.2.1 Anonymous Voting
Another useful application is anonymous voting. First solved by David Chaum
in [12], this problem involves a group of people who desire to vote on a decision.
However, they do not want to reveal the vote of any individual. Using homomorphic
encryption, each person encrypts their vote using the public key for a system. The
encrypted votes are then added together, and the result is decrypted using the secret
key that is held by a small trusted group of talliers to determine the outcome of the
vote without needing to expose the actual votes of any of the participants. Other
uses could be for anonymous surveys on sensitive issues such as past drug use or
criminal records, where the goal is to collect accurate statistics without knowing the
individual sample values. In the voting example, only one type of operation needs to
be handled, namely addition, so this problem has been solved using systems which
are only additively homomorphic such as the Pallier cryptosystem. Other statistics
however, would need a fully homomorphic system. In a 2011 paper [38], a group
from Microsoft Research demonstrate several basic statistics that can be computed
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homomorphically.
4.2.2 Oblivious Prescription Verification
One common specific application is for medical records. Medical records often
contain sensitive, extremely personal information. However, to receive proper care
or have a prescription filled it may be necessary to run a check on these records to
avoid placing the patient in danger. Things to check for might include allergies to
medications, a family history of certain types of problems, and other current serious
health conditions. This can be handled as follows.
1. The patient encrypts all of their personal data and stores it in a public medical
database.
2. When the patient places an order for a certain type of medication, the pharma-
cist runs a safety check algorithm on the patients data. This algorithm checks
all the desired conditions and returns a verification code indicating whether the
patient can take this medicine.
3. The pharmacist sends the encrypted output from this algorithm to the patients
phone, where they decrypt the result to obtain the verification code.
4. The patient shows this verification code to the pharmacist who uses it to decide
whether the patient can safely take the medicine.
To avoid a patient abusing the system and obtaining medicine that is dan-
gerous for them, the verification code should be a function of the medicine being
prescribed and some form of physical identification. For example, the verification
code might be the hash of the patients drivers license number, the prescription num-
ber, and a random key value that the pharmacist used when evaluating the function.
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If done correctly, this will prevent a patient from generating a valid code for medicine
that they should not take.
4.2.3 Contextualized Advertisements
Using homomorphic encryption one can provide customized contextual adver-
tisements to web browsers on mobile devices without revealing which advertisements
are shown to which consumers or the consumers personal information. It works in
the following manner.
1. Using a FHS, the consumer encrypts some information about the products they
use, their current location, their browsing history, etc. and submits this to the
website they are viewing.
2. Companies that buy advertisements from the website encrypt a description of
the types of users that their advertisements target (keywords) and submit this
information along with the encryption of their advertisements to the advertise-
ment database of the website.
3. To decide which advertisements to show a user, the website uses the clients
encrypted information to homomorphically run a matching query on the adver-
tisement database containing the encrypted keywords and advertisements.
4. The result of this query is the set of advertisements for the consumer and these
are sent to the consumer.
5. The consumer decrypts and displays the advertisements.
In this scheme the website learns nothing about the consumer’s personal information
since it is encrypted and is oblivious to which advertisements are sent to the consumer
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since the matching is done homomorphically. One inherent downside to this approach
is that the advertisement database must be encrypted differently for each user in order
to run the matching query homomorphically. Presumably, the advertisers would
store their keywords and advertisements in an unencrypted database and the website
would encrypt the data on the fly for each visitor and then run the matching query
homomorphically. Caching the encrypted versions for each visitor is an option that
requires additional space, but saves on computation for future visits.
4.3 Functional Encryption Applications
4.3.1 Shared Patient Records
Another useful situation in the medical realm involves different doctors needing
to share information about the same patient. A patient may visit several doctors: a
general practitioner, a dentist, an eye doctor, an oncologist, etc. The system works
as follows.
1. Each doctor uses the public key of the patient to encrypt the relevant medical
records from their office and uploads it to the master record for the patient in
the cloud.
2. When the patient is visiting one of his doctors and they need to query some
information contained in one of the records from another doctor, the patient
can use a functional encryption scheme to generate a key specific to this query.
3. With this key the doctor can check the patients medical records at any time to
obtain the plaintext result of the query, but can learn nothing else about their
records.
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This allows the patient to control who has access to his records and avoids
the problem of a doctor refusing to release records for a non-medical reason such as
concern that the patient is going to see another doctor.
4.3.2 NSA Record Collection
In 2013, the NSA came under intense public scrutiny for the PRISM program
which collects information from the internet and telecommunications companies on
a massive scale. Under this program the NSA monitors and stores almost all the
communication it can obtain. In some cases the NSA was given a direct connection
to a company database and allowed to run queries at will. The idea was that when
tracking down criminals or terrorists they could search through this trove of infor-
mation to establish links between individuals in an attempt to thwart their nefarious
activities. In this situation, there is a need to allow the NSA to access this information
when it pertains to possible threats to national security, but at the same time there
are legitimate privacy concerns if the NSA can eavesdrop on whomever it chooses
(including US citizens who have their privacy protected under the Constitution).
It seems impossible to both allow the NSA to have access to all this data while
at the same time preventing them from having indiscriminate access to any record
they choose. The solution is to use a functional encryption system. The internet and
telecommunications companies can encrypt their data under this system and the NSA
can store all of the resulting encrypted data. When the NSA identifies individuals
that pose a threat to the interests of the US, they can present their case for obtaining
access to a judge. Having determined the legitimacy of their request, this judge will
then generate them an access key which allows the NSA to obtain information about
the specified individuals alone by homomorphically querying the encrypted database.
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4.3.3 Private Airline Passenger List Checking
Air travel is tightly controlled by the government in an attempt to prevent
terrorists from turning planes into weapons and to prevent criminals from evading
law enforcement officials. One predominant means of control is by posting a “Do
Not Fly” list (DNF list), which lists those individuals who are not allowed to fly on
airlines in the country. Ideally, the airlines check the DNF list against the passenger
list for each flight and notify the government if someone on it is attempting to take
the flight. The government would like to ensure that the DNF list is checked for
each flight and might want to check the passenger list themselves, since there have
been cases where an airline did not check the DNF list or had an older version of
the list and allowed someone to fly who should not have been allowed to do so. The
airlines are understandably hesitant to turn over the passenger list for each flight to
the government due to privacy concerns.
The following scheme using homomorphic encryption will allow the government
to verify that the passenger list does not contain anyone on the DNF list without
requiring the airline to provide the names of everyone on the flight.
1. The airline encrypts the passenger list under a functional encryption scheme.
2. For each person on the DNF list, the airline provides a function key to the
government which allows them to search the passenger list and determine if
that person is listed.
3. For each flight, the government takes the encrypted passenger list and uses the
function keys to verify that no person from the DNF list is on the passenger list.
If the list is clear of DNF list persons, then they give approval to the airline to




Recall from Chapter 2, that we defined the A-GCD problem as follows:
Problem 12 (Approximate GCD Problem (A-GCD))
Given a set of m integers of the form xi = qip + ri where qi, p, ri ∈ Z and qi and ri
are chosen randomly from some distribution (possibly different distributions), find p.
Also, we noted that oftentimes the problem is revised to include a clean multiple of
p, denoted x0.
Problem 13 (Partial Approximate GCD Problem (pA-GCD))
Given a set of m integers of the form xi = qip + ri where qi, p, ri ∈ Z and qi and ri
are chosen randomly from some distribution (possibly different distributions) and a
clean multiple x0 = q0p, find p.
Homomorphic cryptosystems that follow Gentry’s blueprint often use the A-GCD
problem as a basis for the security. Gentry proposes the following sizes for a security
parameter of λ in the version presented in Chapter 3.
|p|bin = λ2 |qi|bin = λ3 |ri|bin = λ
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5.1 Direct Methods
5.1.1 Brute Force Error Search
The A-GCD problem can be solved by trying to find the error values with
brute force. One clever algorithm to do so is provided by Chen and Nguyen in [13]
and is summarized as follows.
1. For a fixed i, let X = xi(xi + 1)(xi − 1) . . . (xi + r)(xi − r) where |r|bin is the
maximum size of the error.
2. Note that X ≡ qipk mod x0 for some k since one of the factors has ri subtracted
off.
3. Thus, gcd(x0, X) = p.
In this approach they use some clever tricks to parallelize the computation of the
enormous product X and are able to reduce the runtime for the λ = 72 security level
challenge problem posted online by Gentry from 569193 years to 2153 years on a 2.27
GHz machine with 72GB of memory.
5.1.2 Howgrave-Graham Method
In [29], Howgrave-Graham proposes a method to solve the A-GCD (or pA-
GCD) problem when given only two numbers x1 and x2. The paper includes two




and the other is a lattice based approach reminiscent of Coppersmith’s Method
[15] for factoring integers when the high bits of one factor are known. Both methods
are successful when (|qi|bin + |p|bin)|ri|bin < |p|2bin.
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5.1.3 Extended Euclidean Algorithm Approach
The Euclidean Algorithm is an efficient way to find the GCD of two integers
x1 and x2. The Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) keeps track of some extra
information to produce coefficients ai,1 and ai,2 for the i-th step in the algorithm such
that
ai,1x1 + ai,2x2 = ki gcd(x1, x2)
for some ki ∈ Z. The positive term sequence {k1, k2, . . .} is strictly decreasing so that
eventually the algorithm produces coefficients b1 and b2 such that
b1x1 + b2x2 = gcd(x1, x2).
Given some “noisy” multiples of p: x1 = q1p + r0 and x2 = q2p + r2 where |qi|bin is
large, we make the crucial observation that the first several pairs in the sequence of
coefficients produced by the EEA when run on the “clean” multiples q1p and q2p are
exactly the same as the sequence of coefficients produced by the EEA when run on
x1 and x2. This means that
ai,1x1 + ai,2x2 = ai,1(q1p+ r1) + ai,2(q2p+ r2)
= kip+ (ai,1r1 + ai,2r2)
and we have a noisy multiple of p that is smaller. Eventually, the size of the noise
term will grow too large and this will not hold. Using the given clean multiple x0 in
place of one of the xi’s will help as well. The following algorithm is based on this
observation.
1. Run the EEA (part way) on x0 and any of the xi’s to obtain b0 and bi such that
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the size of b0x0 + bixi is about the size of p (we want it to be a few more bits in
size). If no clean multiple is available, just pick two random xi’s each time.
2. If the error hasn’t grown too much then b0x0 + bixi should be a small multiple
of p with some error.
3. Repeating this process on many of the xi’s one can obtain a good estimate of
the higher bits of p.
This should work if |qi|bin + |ri|bin ≤ |p|bin. In most cases, |qi|bin >> |p|bin so
this does not work for the parameter sizes proposed by Gentry.
5.2 Heuristic Methods
Using the EEA we seek to find a linear combination of x1 and x2 that is a
small noisy multiple of p. However, the binary size of qi forces the coefficients to be
quite large and the error term grows too much. To improve on this idea, we seek to
use more than just two numbers in the linear combination.
5.2.1 Binary Matrix Approach
Given the list of noisy multiples we would like to transform it into a list
(possibly shorter) of small noisy multiples of p. To do so, we repeatedly add and
subtract the noisy multiples in an attempt to produce smaller numbers. Looking
at the binary representation of each xi we can use other multiples with matching
binary subsequences to reduce the size of xi quickly. An algorithm developed from
this concept is presented below.
1. Treat each xi as a vector with components given by its binary representation.
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2. Let M be the matrix whose rows are these vectors.
3. Row reduce M over F2.
4. While reducingM , if a row vector’s size (i.e. the size of the binary representation
of the corresponding integer) is about the size of p then remove it from the
matrix and save the corresponding integer in a list of small near multiples of p.
5. Use the list of small near multiples of p and the EEA to try to recover p.
The idea behind this approach is to keep the “error bits” from growing, similar
to the way noisy polynomial GCD algorithms work. We attempt to keep each bit in
its own column so the error cannot overflow into the multiple of p. However, it does
not appear to be guaranteed to work and when it does work, it may just be dumb
luck.
5.2.2 Greedy List Reduction Approach
We do gain some intuition from the binary matrix approach. In order to reduce
the size of the xi’s quickly we need to subtract pairs that are as close as possible in
some sense. There are several ways to choose to do this, but the basic algorithm is
presented below. The appendix includes a full implementation.
1. Let I0 = {xi}.
2. Form the set Uj ⊆ Ij, where x ∈ Uj if |x|bin = max({|y|bin | y ∈ Ij}).
3. Order the elements in Uj = {s0, s1, . . . , sm} from smallest (s0) to largest (sm).
4. Form the set Ūj = {sk+1 − sk | k = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} (note that every element of
Ūj will have size strictly smaller than any of the elements in Uj).
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5. Form the set Ij+1 = (Ij \ Uj) ∪ Ūj.
6. Run this same procedure (steps 2 - 5) on Ij+1 until at least two (or some other
specified number) of the elements in the set satisfy the bound for the EEA to
work.
7. Run the EEA on random pairs of the elements obtained above which satisfy
the bound. With high probability, the majority vote of the results will be the
value of p.
The following table summarizes some computational results when this method
is used. In the table on the left, m = |pi|bin + |qi|bin. In the table on the right, the
value of m is increased and the other parameters are held constant. Notice, that after
a certain point having more multiples actually hinders the process. This is possibly
due to reducing each number with the next smallest number (see other possibilities
below the table).
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p size qi size ri size m break
75 25 25 100 100%
150 50 50 200 100%
225 75 75 300 100%
300 100 100 400 100%
75 75 25 150 70%
150 150 50 300 90%
225 225 75 450 82%
300 300 100 600 72%
75 150 25 225 0%
150 300 50 450 0%
225 450 75 675 74%
300 600 100 900 70%
75 225 25 300 0%
125 250 25 375 72%
375 750 75 1125 62%
125 500 25 625 0%
p size qi size ri size m break
75 150 25 225 0%
75 150 25 250 0%
75 150 25 275 0%
75 150 25 300 2%
75 150 25 325 2%
75 150 25 350 12%
75 150 25 375 34%
75 150 25 400 66%
75 150 25 425 94%
75 150 25 450 90%
75 150 25 475 86%
75 150 25 500 74%
75 150 25 525 76%
75 150 25 550 60%
75 150 25 575 68%
75 150 25 600 72%
Table 5.1: Greedy List Reduction Results
There are several options for reducing the numbers in Uj.
 Neighbor pairs (i.e. sk+1 − sk)
 Largest (i.e. sm − sk)
 Smallest (i.e. sk − s0)
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 Least “dirty”: keep track of how many times a number has been involved in
a subtraction and use the one that has been involved in the least number of
operations to reduce the other numbers of that size.
 High bit similarity (this is tricky to analyze but seems to not work very well)
Our results seem to agree with the bound from Howgrave-Graham’s method. How-
ever, we may do slightly better as the gap between |p|bin and |ri|bin increases or as
the number of multiples increases. In the third group in the left table, the Howgrave-
Graham bound is exactly equal and we can solve it for bigger parameter sizes. Also,
the bound is exactly satisfied for the right table and we are able to solve it as m
increases.
5.3 Lattice Based Approaches
5.3.1 Standard LLL Reduction Approach
This idea of using many of the multiples to reduce the size of xi can be improved
on in at least two respects. First, if you are given a clean multiple x0 subtracting
xj from xi is not the only way to reduce the size of xi. In some situations, you
could add xj to xi and then reduce the result modulo x0 and get a smaller multiple.
Second, in essence we are looking for a linear combination of the xi’s with small
integer coefficients (the coefficient on x0 can be quite large if needed since it will
not be multiplying any error). Recall from Chapter 2, that the LLL algorithm finds
a short orthogonal basis for a lattice. The following algorithm utilizes these two
improvements. It is called the h-star algorithm and a full implementation is included
in the appendix.
92
1. Form the (m+ 1)× (m+ 1) basis matrix, L, for a lattice as follows
L =

0 0 . . . 0 x0
1 0 . . . 0 x1






0 0 . . . 1 xm

Intuitively, to obtain a short vector in this lattice you add and subtract the
last m rows as needed to decrease the component in the last column of each
row. The coefficients are tracked by the m×m identity matrix and the top row
allows for reducing modulo x0 with no increase in the coefficients.
2. Run the LLL algorithm on L to produce a reduced basis, B.
B =

b0,0 b0,1 . . . b0,m





bm−1,0 bm−1,1 . . . bm−1,m
bm,0 bm,1 . . . bm,m

3. The last row bm in B often contains elements with large entries so we remove
it to form the m× (m+ 1) matrix B̄.
B̄ =

b0,0 b0,1 . . . b0,m





bm−1,0 bm−1,1 . . . bm−1,m

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1 0 . . . 0 h0,m−1 h0,m






0 0 . . . 1 hm−2,m−1 hm−2,m
0 0 . . . 0 hm−1,m−1 hm−1,m

5. As it turns out, hm−1,m−1 often has a common factor with the clean multiple
x0 = q0p. In fact, generally hm−1,m−1 = q0 or q0 = khm−1,m−1 for a small k.
6. To make the notation easier we will denote hm−1,m−1 by h
∗.
7. So we compute gcd(x0, h
∗) to find q0 and then recover p from x0.
The following examples illustrate the results one can obtain.
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0 0 0 0 869449743762409
1 0 0 0 675478860334176
0 1 0 0 768514237144518
0 0 1 0 836955889912598




−78 −313 107 38 −61
2 −50 148 −63 386
−115 54 266 −364 −299
−455 −69 −386 −130 207




−78 −313 107 38 −61
2 −50 148 −63 386
−115 54 266 −364 −299




1 0 0 328736030 9204608811
0 1 0 734520646 20566578106
0 0 1 305312788 8548758085
0 0 0 1013081383 28366278724

So h∗ = 1013081383 and in this case, the clean multiple x0 factors as follows so we
can easily find p.
x0 = q0p = 1013081383× 858223
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0 0 0 0 507427346501992
1 0 0 0 141803231186811
0 1 0 0 415217704063463
0 0 1 0 408155643521144




54 147 −299 194 −33
720 216 366 −67 −116
116 534 239 375 498
650 −335 −385 −327 321




54 147 −299 194 −33
720 216 366 −67 −116
116 534 239 375 498




2 1 4 12850554 2724317581
0 4 3 522533 110776432
0 0 7 2052942 435224096
0 0 0 13555117 2873684804

So h∗ = 13555117 and in this case, the clean multiple x0 factors as follows so we can
easily find p.
x0 = q0p = 2
3 × 7× 13555117× 668471
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The following table summarizes some computational results for this method.
To determine m for each set of parameters we ran the algorithm on 10 random
instances. The first value of m such that decreasing it resulted in some instances not
being solved is reported below.






50 950 20 36
50 950 21 37
50 950 22 39
50 950 23 40
50 950 24 42
50 950 25 44
50 950 26 46
50 950 27 49






100 950 20 13
100 950 21 13
100 950 22 13
100 950 23 13
100 950 24 14
100 950 25 14
100 950 26 14
100 950 27 14
100 950 28 14






100 950 70 38
100 950 71 39
100 950 72 41
100 950 73 42
100 950 74 44
100 950 75 47
100 950 76 48
100 950 77 51






50 450 20 17
50 450 21 18
50 450 22 19
50 450 23 19
50 450 24 20
50 450 25 21
50 450 26 22
50 450 27 23
50 450 28 24
Table 5.2: Standard LLL Reduction Results
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Note the following observations about each group.
1. Group 1 and Group 3 are similar since they have the same number of bits in qi,
and the gap between the r size and the p size is the same.
2. For Group 2, the number of multiples needed is very sharp (i.e. m = 13 works
every time m = 12 fails every time).
3. Group 4 requires about half as many multiples as Group 1 since the q size is
about half the size of q in Group 1.
Unfortunately, this will still not work for the types of parameters that Gentry suggests.
We attribute this to the fact that the LLL algorithm does not find a small enough
vector unless we have many near multiples of p.
5.3.2 Linear Program Reduction Approach
The LLL algorithm produces an orthogonal basis for the lattice composed
of “short vectors”. In our case (and many other applications) the goal is to find
just a single short vector (in the 1-norm sense) without regard of the size of the other
vectors or whether they are orthogonal or not. To reduce a vector b by a set of vectors
V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vt} ⊆ Zn we need to solve the following minimization problem.
min ‖b− (x1v1 + x1v1 + . . .+ xtvt)‖1
s.t. xi ∈ Z
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s.t. yi ≥ bi −
t∑
j=1








∀ i = 1 . . . n
xi ∈ Z
Dropping the requirement that the coefficients be integers, we obtain the following





s.t. yi ≥ bi −
t∑
j=1








∀ i = 1 . . . n
Solving this relaxation of the original minimization problem is at the heart of
the following subroutine called REDUCE, which takes a vector b and a set of vectors
V and reduces the 1-norm of b as much as possible by the vectors in V .
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function reduce(b, V )
1. solve LP
2. round each component of the solution from (1) to the nearest integer










This REDUCE subroutine is then used as part of the main reduction algorithm
called POST PROCESS. We sketch an outline of how it works below, and a full
implementation is provided in the appendix.
Parameters
1. N is the number of “neighbor” vectors (vectors immediately adjacent in
the list) to use initially in the REDUCE method
2. TOLNEIGHBORS is a tolerance for when we move from round 1 to round 2
3. TOLOV ERALL is a tolerance for when we increase N
Procedure
B Start with a list of vectors.
B Round 1
1. For each vector in the list, use the next N vectors in the REDUCE
subroutine to reduce the 1-norm of the vector.
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2. After all vectors have been reduced, randomly shuffle the list.
3. Repeat round 1 until the difference in the average norm of the vectors
from one iteration to the next is changing less than TOLNEIGHBORS.
B Sort the list of vectors by increasing 1-norm.
B Round 2
1. For each vector in the list, use the next N vectors in the REDUCE
subroutine to reduce the 1-norm of the vector.
2. After each reduction, bubble up the new vector to keep the list sorted
and start reducing the list from the position of the new vector.
B If the average norm of the vectors in the list changed in rounds 1 and 2
more than TOLOV ERALL, then increase N by 1 and repeat rounds 1 and
2.
The following is an example of what we can achieve with this POST PROCESS
algorithm. The problem instance consisted of 100 vectors with |p|bin = 20, |qi|bin = 20,
|ri|bin = 10, and the algorithm was initialized with N = 2 (to start with).
Smallest Norm Average Norm
Original 525719146354 792105821828.48510742
LLL 8 25.58415842
POST PROCESS 7 22.05940594
Running POST PROCESS used 46 neighbors in the last iteration. It was
terminated after 1 hour. The smaller vector with a 1-norm of 7 was found fairly
quickly. The following table summarizes some computational results obtained from
running this method.
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num entry num Original LLL POST PROCESS average
vectors size neighbors short average short average short average decrease
20 20 5 352736 487818 4 7.52380952 4 6.85714286 8.9%
20 20 5 478828 743932.8095 4 7.80952381 4 6.95238095 11.0%
40 20 5 305847 442379.9756 2 6.51219512 2 5.43902439 16.5%
80 20 5 281885 420903.4321 2 5.65432099 2 4.49382716 20.5%
20 80 5 6.07E+23 8.73E+23 22 65733088.05 22 50829934.62 22.7%
40 80 10 4.24E+23 6.08E+23 17 23059502.76 17 19047560.02 17.4%*
40 80 10 5.56E+23 8.09E+23 18 30029364.49 16 26929374.93 10.3%*
40 80 20 3.47E+23 5.09E+23 17 19253819.88 17 15129039.98 21.4%
40 80 20 3.87E+23 5.86E+23 18 21174925 18 16483408.24 22.2%
Table 5.3: POST PROCESS Results
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From Table 5.3 on the previous page, note the following.
1. Rows marked with an * were terminated after an hour (TOLOV ERALL should
have been higher).
2. In row 7 we actually found a shorter vector.
Since the solving of LP really slows things down as N increases, we view
the algorithm as a post processing step after running the LLL algorithm. From our
experiments, the LLL algorithm does a really good job of finding a short vector (in
both the 2-norm and 1-norm sense). So, while we can improve the average size of the
vectors in the lattice basis, we are primarily making only the larger vectors smaller.
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Appendix
The algorithms discussed in Chapter 5 were implemented in SAGE 6.2 and
run on an 8 core 64-bit Intel Xeon processor at 2.4 GHz with 12 GB of RAM. The
code for each one is provided below.
Extended Euclidean Algorithm Approach
def b i n s i z e (num) :
””” re turns the l e n g t h o f the b inary r ep r e s en t a t i on o f num”””
num = abs (num)
return len (bin (abs (num) ) [ 2 : ] )
def EEA( g 0 , g 1 , s i z e ) :
””” re turns a and b such t ha t
a* g 0 + b* g 1 = r
where b i n s i z e ( r ) <= s i z e
”””
reversed = f a l s e
# ensure t ha t | r 0 | > | r 1 |
i f abs ( g 1 ) < abs ( g 0 ) :
r 0 = g 0
r 1 = g 1
else :
r 0 = g 1
r 1 = g 0
reversed = true
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r i = r 1 # we j u s t do t h i s to ”prime” the loop
m = matrix (QQ, [ [ 1 , 0 ] , [ 0 , 1 ] ] )
# note : r i = m[1 , 0 ]* g 0 + m[1 , 1 ]* g 1
while b i n s i z e ( r i ) > s i z e :
q i = r 0 // r 1
r i = r 0 − q i * r 1
r temp = r 0 − ( q i + 1) * r 1
i f abs ( r temp ) < r i :
q i += 1
r i = r temp
r 0 = r 1
r 1 = r i
m = matrix (QQ, [ [ 0 , 1 ] , [ 1 , − q i ] ] ) *m
# handle r eve r s ed inpu t s
i f reversed :
return [m[ 1 , 1 ] ,m[ 1 , 0 ] ]
else :
return [m[ 1 , 0 ] ,m[ 1 , 1 ] ]
Greedy List Reduction Approach
def add num( key d i c t , num, e r r ) :
””” adds (num, err ) to the k ey d i c t ,
which i s keyed on the b i n s i z e o f nums
”””
num size = b i n s i z e (num)
i f num size not in key d i c t . keys ( ) :
k ey d i c t [ num size ] = [ ]
k ey d i c t [ num size ] . append ( (num, e r r ) )
def g e t s i z e s ( k ey d i c t ) :
””” re turns the so r t ed l i s t o f keys in k e y d i c t ”””
s i z e s = key d i c t . keys ( )
return sorted ( s i z e s , r e v e r s e=true )
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def ge t r educed keys ( k e y l i s t , q s i z e , r s i z e , p s i z e ) :
””” ne ighbor method : s u b t r a c t each number
from the next b i g g e s t number ( pa i rw i s e )
”””
from operator import i t emge t t e r
from heapq import heapi fy , heappop , heappush
key d i c t = {}
for num in k e y l i s t :
add num( key d i c t , num, r s i z e )
r ed keys = [ ]
s i z e s = g e t s i z e s ( k ey d i c t )
c u r s i z e = s i z e s [ 0 ]
while c u r s i z e > p s i z e :
# form the s e t o f the b i g g e s t keys
cur nums = key d i c t . pop ( c u r s i z e )
# check f o r | q i | + | r i | < | p | and | r i | <= | q i |
for num data in cur nums :
upper bound holds = True
lower bound holds = True
c u r q s i z e = c u r s i z e − p s i z e
c u r r s i z e = num data [ 1 ]
i f c u r q s i z e + c u r r s i z e >= p s i z e :
upper bound holds = False
next
i f c u r r s i z e > c u r q s i z e :
lower bound holds = False
next
i f upper bound holds and l ower bound holds :
r ed keys . append ( num data [ 0 ] )
i f len ( r ed keys ) > 0 :
return r ed keys
# now we a c t u a l l y reduce the numbers in the column
cur nums = sorted ( cur nums , r e v e r s e=true )
num 1 data = cur nums [ 0 ]
for num 2 data in cur nums [ 1 : ] :
# ca l c u l a t e new number
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new num = num 1 data [ 0 ] − num 2 data [ 0 ]
# ca l c u l a t e new error e s t imate
i f num 1 data [ 1 ] == num 2 data [ 1 ] :
new err = num 1 data [ 1 ] + 1
else :
# po s s i b l y t h i s shou ld be + 1
new err = max( num 1 data [ 1 ] , num 2 data [ 1 ] )
add num( key d i c t , new num , new err )
num 1 data = num 2 data
# ge t new b i g g e s t s i z e
s i z e s = g e t s i z e s ( k ey d i c t )
i f len ( s i z e s ) > 0 :
c u r s i z e = s i z e s [ 0 ]
else :
c u r s i z e = 0
# i f we ge t to here we are re tu rn ing an empty l i s t
return r ed keys
def g e t p gu e s s e s ( red keys , p s i z e , num of guesses ) :
””” run the EEA on random pa i r s o f keys from
red key s to ob ta in gues se s at mu l t i p l e s o f p
num of guesses i s how many pa i r s to choose
”””
p gue s s e s = {}
p bad gues se s = {}
i f len ( r ed keys ) == 0 :
print ( ”No reduced keys found” )
e l i f len ( r ed keys ) == 1 :
print ( ”Only one reduced key found : ” )
p gue s s e s [ r ed keys [ 0 ] ] = red keys [ 0 ]
else :
for k in range (0 , num of guesses ) :
( r 0 , r 1 ) = get rand keys ( r ed keys )
output = EEA( r 0 , r 1 , p s i z e − 1)
denom 1 = ZZ(abs ( output [ 1 ] ) )
i f denom 1 == 0 :
# ju s t a s s i gn unique nega t i v e va l u e s
# so the e s t ima t e s are not equa l
e s t imate 1 = −1
else :
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e s t imate 1 = r 0 //denom 1
rem 1 = r 0 % denom 1
i f rem 1 > denom 1 / 2 :
e s t imate 1 += 1
denom 2 = ZZ(abs ( output [ 0 ] ) )
i f denom 2 == 0 :
# ju s t a s s i gn unique nega t i v e va l u e s
# so the e s t ima t e s are not equa l
e s t imate 2 = −2
else :
e s t imate 2 = r 1 //denom 2
rem 2 = r 1 % denom 2
i f rem 2 > denom 2 / 2 :
e s t imate 2 += 1
# only count the e s t imate i f they are equa l
i f e s t imate 1 == es t imate 2 :
i f p gue s s e s . has key ( e s t imate 2 ) :
p gue s s e s [ e s t imate 2 ] += 1
else :
p gue s s e s [ e s t imate 2 ] = 1
else : # keep t rack o f bad gues se s j u s t f o r fun
i f p bad gues se s . has key ( e s t imate 1 ) :
p bad gues se s [ e s t imate 1 ] += 1
else :
p bad gues se s [ e s t imate 1 ] = 1
i f p bad gues se s . has key ( e s t imate 2 ) :
p bad gues se s [ e s t imate 2 ] += 1
else :
p bad gues se s [ e s t imate 2 ] = 1
return ( p guesses , p bad gues se s )
Standard LLL Reduction Approach
def h s t a r a l g o r i t hm ( mul t ip l e s , c l e an mu l t i p l e ) :
””” re turns a mu l t i p l e o f p or 0 i f none was found ”””
# the l a t t i c e
L = [ ]
m = len ( mu l t i p l e s )
# add the c l ean mu l t i p l e in t o the l a t t i c e
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L . append ( [ 0 ] *m + [ c l e an mu l t i p l e ] )
# add the noisy mu l t i p l e s i n t o the l a t t i c e
for i in range (0 , m) :
L . append ( [ 0 ] * i + [ 1 ] + [ 0 ] * (m−i −1) + [ mu l t i p l e s [ i ] %
↪→ c l e an mu l t i p l e ] )
L matrix = Matrix (ZZ , L)
r educed ba s i s = L matrix .LLL( )
B = reduced ba s i s [ 0 :m]
H = B. eche lon form ( )
# check the second to l a s t p o s i t i o n in the l a s t row
# fo r a p o s s i b l e f a c t o r o f the c l ean mu l t i p l e
h s t a r = H[m−1] [m−1]
i f h s t a r != 0 and c l e an mu l t i p l e % h s t a r == 0 :




Linear Program Reduction Approach
def reduce (b , V) :
””” f i nd r = b − sum a i v i
such t ha t norm 1 ( r ) <= norm 1 ( b )
”””
prog = MixedIntegerLinearProgram ( maximization = False )
# the y ' s w i l l be nonnegative , but t ha t i s f o r ced by our c on s t r a i n t s
y = prog . new var iab l e (name = ”y” , nonnegat ive = False )
x = prog . new var iab l e (name = ”x” , nonnegat ive = False )
for i in range (0 , len (V) ) :
prog . set min (x [ i ] , None )
prog . s e t o b j e c t i v e (sum( y [ i ] for i in range (0 , len (b) ) ) )
for i in range (0 , len (b) ) :
sum term = sum( x [ j ] * V[ j ] [ i ] for j in range (0 , len (V) ) )
prog . add cons t ra in t ( y [ i ] >= b [ i ] − sum term )
prog . add cons t ra in t ( y [ i ] >= −(b [ i ] − sum term ) )
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prog . s o l v e ( )
r ed ve c t o r = ( vec to r (b) − sum( int (round( prog . g e t v a l u e s ( x [ j ] ) ) ) *
↪→ vec to r (V[ j ] ) for j in range (0 , len (V) ) ) )
i f r ed ve c t o r . norm (1) <= b . norm (1) :
return r ed ve c t o r
else :
return b
def sort by norm (L) :
””” s o r t s the v e c t o r s in L
in inc r ea s in g order by 1−norm
”””
import heapq
temp = [ ]
for row in L :
temp . append ( ( row . norm(1) , row ) )
heapq . heap i fy ( temp)
output = [ ]
while len ( temp) > 0 :
p i e c e s = heapq . heappop ( temp)
output . append ( p i e c e s [ 1 ] )
return output
def bubble up (L , index ) :
””” moves the vec t o r at p o s i t i o n
index up in L so t ha t L i s
so r t ed by inc r ea s i n g 1−norm
”””
cur row = L [ index ]
cur norm = cur row . norm(1)
cur index = index − 1
while cur index >= 0 :
i f cur norm >= L [ cur index ] . norm (1) :
# remove the row and i n s e r t i t in the co r r e c t p l ace
L . pop ( index )
L . i n s e r t ( cur index + 1 , cur row )
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return (L , cur index + 1)
else :
cu r index −= 1
# t h i s row has a sma l l e r norm than a l l the prev ious rows
L . pop ( index )
L . i n s e r t (0 , cur row )
return (L , 0)
def post process LLL (B, num neighbors , t o l n e i ghbo r s , t o l o v e r a l l ) :
””” reduces the 1−norm of a l l v e c t o r s in B”””
import random
ba s i s = copy (B)
old avg norm = 0
# ju s t to prime the loop
cur avg norm = t o l o v e r a l l + t o l n e i g hbo r s
while abs ( cur avg norm − old avg norm ) > t o l o v e r a l l :
# Round 1
while abs ( cur avg norm − old avg norm ) > t o l n e i g hbo r s :
for i in range (0 , len ( b a s i s ) ) :
cu r v e c t o r = ba s i s [ i ]
b a s i s [ i ] = reduce ( cur vec to r , b a s i s [max( i −
↪→ num neighbors , 0) : i ] )
old avg norm = cur avg norm
cur avg norm = f loat (sum( [ vec . norm (1) for vec in ba s i s ] ) ) /
↪→ len ( b a s i s )
random . s h u f f l e ( b a s i s )
# Round 2
r e d ba s i s = sort by norm ( ba s i s )
cur index = 1
while cur index < len ( r e d ba s i s ) :
cu r v e c t o r = r ed ba s i s [ cur index ]
index bound = min( cur index , num neighbors )
r e d ba s i s [ cur index ] = reduce ( cur vec to r , r e d b a s i s [ 0 :
↪→ index bound ] )
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( r ed ba s i s , cur index ) = bubble up ( r ed ba s i s , cur index )
cur index += 1
ba s i s = copy ( r e d ba s i s )
old avg norm = cur avg norm
cur avg norm = f loat (sum( [ vec . norm (1) for vec in r e d ba s i s ] ) ) /
↪→ len ( r e d ba s i s )
return ba s i s
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